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The premise of this study is the principle that prevention, preparedness, response and 
recovery strategies for complex manmade threats to our nation necessitate both 
collaboration and knowledge sharing among government agencies. The thesis asks, 
“What can be learned by examining the New Jersey homeland security environment 
through both hierarchical and ecosystem models, and what aid can those heuristic 
templates provide to organizational decision making?”  The analysis of existing literature 
revealed two sets of frameworks or conceptual lenses. The hierarchical framework 
includes command and control, authorities, planning, information flows, organizational 
culture and behavior, SOPs, policy, and governance. The ecosystem framework includes 
strategic planning, cooperation, collaboration, interdependencies, information flows, 
diversity, emergence, and networks. The two frameworks are used to conduct 
comparative case studies of past complex events that occurred within the New Jersey’s 
homeland security environment. 
The study’s findings suggest that New Jersey’s fusion center, based on its 
structure and capabilities, is suitable for blending both organizational frameworks, 
leading it to having the capacity to solve complex issues through collaboration, 
emergence, strategic planning, networks, and information sharing. 
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All science, no matter how arcane or irrelevant it may appear to outsiders, 
has broader implications, which can lead the willing scholar into some 
quite unfamiliar territory. (Geerat Vermeij)1 
A. RESEARCH QUESTION 
The premise of this study is based on the belief that prevention strategies for 
complex man-made threats to our nation require collaboration and knowledge sharing 
among government agencies to enhance prevention, preparedness, response, and recovery 
efforts. This dictum has resulted in the creation of the “homeland security” environment, 
which includes many individual hierarchal agencies. In these agencies, leaders are 
expected or required to function in a non-linear manner as they attempt to connect, share 
information, and collaborate in a rugged environment that calls for characteristics closely 
mirroring those of a complex adaptive system.   
This researcher therefore asks, What can be learned through a comparative 
analysis that examines the New Jersey homeland security environment through both 
hierarchical and ecosystem models, and what influence do those models have on decision 
makers? 
In order to respond to this primary research question, this thesis will also seek to 
answer the following second tier of questions: 
1. What are the prominent links that connect government agency leaders 
within the New Jersey state homeland security environment? 
2. What element, processes, laws, and or strategies, direct decision makers in 
their homeland security mission? 
3. How does an ecosystem perspective inform the design of future fusion 
center knowledge sharing and collaboration initiatives within the New 
Jersey state homeland security environment? 
                                                 
1 Cecie Starr, Biology : Concepts and Applications, 2nd ed. (Belmont, CA: Wadsworth Publishing 
Company, 1994), 568. 
 2 
B. PROBLEM SPACE 
The current hierarchical model of New Jersey government closely resembles the 
twentieth-century mechanistic principles established by Max Weber and Fredrick 
Taylor.2  This structure provides order and tightly controlled rules, policies, and 
procedures. Leaders and subordinates have clearly defined responsibilities to which there 
is limited flexibility in assuming tasks or mission objectives that fall outside the 
structured framework provided through agency directives. This organizational design 
does not always allow for, or encourage, information and knowledge sharing as was 
pointed out in the 9/11 Commission Report.3  Most agencies work independently of one 
another and focus primarily on agency-specific strategies. The inherent barriers 
associated with hierarchical, mechanistic models hamper agency collaboration, 
knowledge sharing, and goal setting. The hierarchical model presents a centralized 
structure that lends itself to strict lines of authority and responsibility. While hierarchical 
models are ideal for handling traditional problems, those problems do not capture the 
complexity found in today’s homeland security environment. The complex issues 
currently facing homeland security agencies demand a greater level of flexibility then is 
offered by hierarchical mechanistic models and may benefit from an examination of 
alternative structures and /or systems, such as ecosystems, which may offer additional 
insights into the complex and dynamic nature of the homeland security enterprise. 
Through an examination of complex systems, including natural ecosystems, 
scholars have recognized the value natural sciences offer social scientist in the study of 
organizational behavior. In an ecosystem, certain characteristics can be analyzed to 
measure the fitness of the environment. Diversity, connectedness, interdependency, and 
adaptability are often the key features explored in complex systems. In this context, 
diversity is the number and type of species; connectedness is the way in which agents in a 
system connect and relate to one another; interdependency is the influence one agents 
actions have on another agents; and adaptability is the ability for complex adaptive 
                                                 
2 Scott E. Page, Understanding Complexity (Chantilly, VA: The Teaching Company, 2009). 
3 National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States [9/11 Commision], The 9 11 
Commission Report : Final Report of the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States 
(New York: Norton & Co, 2004), 77. 
 3 
systems to learn and adjust to external variables. Where homeland security is a complex 
adaptive system and ecosystems are prototypical examples of complex systems, one 
might deduce that homeland security can be modeled as an ecosystem. 
Using biomimicry, the discipline that seeks solutions by emulating nature’s 
designs and processes there is considerable opportunity to learn solutions for man-made 
problems.4 By modeling the homeland security environment in New Jersey as an 
ecosystem, this study will seek the perspectives, insights, and organizational and systemic 
lessons of ecosystems as a way to improve and advance the complexity, responsiveness, 
and resiliency of homeland security at the state level. This research will look to create a 
model where individual agencies, similar to agents in an ecosystem, represent organisms 
and energy is represented as knowledge and information sharing. The model will seek to 
enhance flows of energy or information between agencies to further develop 
connectedness and interdependency between organizations. 
Through a comparative analysis using qualitative data the study will examine the 
current homeland security environment with one modeled after an ecosystem. Data from 
current legal statutes, federal, and state plans, committee by laws and governance, and 
other public source documents will be used for analysis.   
 
  
                                                 
4 Gerard Briscoe, “Creating a Digital Ecosystem: Service-Oriented Architectures with Distributed 
Evolutionary Computing (London: Imperial College London: 2009), 42 (abs 0712.4159). 
 4 
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II. LITERATURE REVIEW 
A. INTRODUCTION 
The literature review is comprised of two distinct sections. In the first section the 
literature review examines various perspectives and characteristics of traditional 
hierarchical organizations. The second section provides a review of ecosystems, which is 
separated into three parts: general systems theory, business ecosystem, and digital 
ecosystems. From this research characteristics of the hierarchical and ecosystem research 
are used to create two separate frameworks for analysis. 
B. HIERARCHICAL ORGANIZATIONS  
Although there are a number of different definitions of organizations, most all 
agree that organizations consist of a family of interacting, hierarchically arranged, 
decision-making units.5  Some of the essential characteristics include a vertical 
arrangement of subsystems, which make up the entire system, where authority rests at the 
higher-level subsystems, as well as a dependence on the lower level subsystems for actual 
performance of work.6 
Organizations provide structure and create capabilities for achieving objectives 
and performing tasks. An example can be found in the manufacturing industry where the 
collective contribution of many individuals, when working in harmony, can lead to high 
levels of production that would otherwise not be possible. Organizational structure also 
provides direction while creating levels of control for management. This structure can 
lead to an emergence of culture, which can shape the behavior of individuals within the 
organization in ways that conform to informal and formal norms.7  Culture is defined as, 
“the set of values, norms, guiding beliefs, and understanding that is shared by members 
of an organization and taught to new members as the correct way to think, feel, and 
                                                 
5 Dante P. Martinelli, “Systems Hierarchies and Management,” Systems Research and Behavioral 
Science 18, no. 1 (January 25, 2001): 69, doi:10.1002/sres.390. 
6 Ibid. 
7 Graham T. Allison and Philip Zelikow, Essence of Decision : Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis 
(New York [etc.]: Longman, 1999), 145. 
 6 
behave. It represents the unwritten, feeling part of the organization.”8  As organizational 
culture emerges to shape the behavior of individuals within the organization, the result 
becomes a distinctive entity with its own identity and momentum.9   
In one theory, the development of the hierarchical organization suggests that 
during the Industrial Revolution work became more complex and was performed by 
greater numbers of workers, which resulted in a pressing need to develop new ways of 
managing and controlling the organization.10  Today, government behavior, as it relates 
to organizational design, is believed to focus more on outputs than choices, which are 
developed through standard patterns of behavior.11  
According to authors David Alberts and Richard Hayes, hierarchical 
organizations are believed to have developed and perfected during the Industrial Age.12 
In their analysis, the principles of command and control within organizations apply to 
both Industrial Age warfare and Industrial Age economics and business.13  Some of the 
principles include, decomposition, specialization, hierarchy, and centralized planning.14  
The principle of decomposition is one where organizations are divided into 
subsets. For example, universities are divided into departments, and military 
organizations divide staff functions into personnel, intelligence, operations, logistics, 
etc.15 From decomposition to specialization, yet another set of subsets is created where 
groups specialize on specific areas of expertise to support the greater organization. In  
 
 
                                                 
8 Richard L. Daft, Organization Theory and Design, 10th ed. (Mason, Ohio: South-Western Cengage 
Learning, 2010), 317. 
9 Allison and Zelikow, Essence of Decision, 145. 
10 Daft, Organization Theory and Design, 56. 
11 Allison and Zelikow, Essence of Decision, 145. 
12 David Alberts and Richard Hayes, Power to the Edge : Command, Control in the Information Age 
(Washington  DC: CCRP Publication Series, 2003), 41. 
13 Ibid., 37. 
14 Ibid. 
15 Ibid., 41. 
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military operations, specialization has generated capacities that could not have been 
created through generalists.16  The result of decomposition and specialization creates 
even greater levels of hierarchy.   
With the various subsets created within organizations additional layers of 
management were also created to ensure that: individuals understood goals and policies; 
goals and policies were transmitted to subordinates; plans were developed to coordinate 
actions; performance monitored; and feedback exchanged with leadership.17  In complex 
hierarchical organizations with many specialized functions, numerous layers of 
management are created to ensure information flows up and down the chain of command. 
To achieve success, leaders rely on plans. In the military, plans are the mechanism by 
which commanders seek to create the conditions necessary for success. In the public 
sector, hierarchical organizations also rely on the use of strategic plans to describe the 
mission, vision, and goals of the agency. 
Within this model, strategic planning is the cornerstone for providing direction 
and maintaining control of the agency mission, goals, and objectives. An agency’s use of 
its pre-defined capabilities and methods for developing strategies are based on 
organizational assets and capabilities, which explains some of the inherent qualities of 
hierarchical organizations. The literature review examines two distinct schools of 
decision-making and the impact the planning methodology has on a leader’s approach to 
decision making.   
An agency’s methodology for developing strategic plans can have a significant 
influence on how leaders direct and control an organization. Consistent with the 
hierarchical organizational model, many government agencies have adopted and still use 
strategy concepts developed in the 1960s and 1970s, including the design and planning  
 
 
                                                 
16 Alberts and Hayes, Power to the Edge, 40. 
17 Ibid., 41. 
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models.18 The characteristics of the design and planning school models of strategic 
planning assist leaders to provide direction and further influence their decision-making 
processes. 
According to the authors of the book Strategic Safari, the design school proposes 
a strategy model that aims to fit organizational capabilities with external possibilities.19  
The premise of design school methodology is based on several concepts, some of which 
include:  
 Formation should be a deliberate process of conscious thought, where 
strategies are deliberate;  
 Strategies are the responsibility of the chief executive officer, who has 
command and control;  
 Strategy formation is kept simple;  
 Strategies are one of a kind;  
 Strategies are fully formulated, leaving little room for emergence; and  
 Strategies are only implemented after being fully developed.20  
Where strategies provide direction through a set of goals and objectives, it is 
formal policy and standing operating procedures (SOPs) that ensure agencies and their 
individual subsets adhere to prescribed roles and responsibilities. 
In the design school model, leaders are expected to be capable of developing 
strategies through a single perspective—theirs—from their position at the top of the 
hierarchical chain. Much of the analysis in this design uses the agency’s strengths, 
weaknesses, opportunities, and threats (SWOT) or SWOT model, to underpin plans.21  
This practice has proven to be an invaluable tool for executives where they can use their 
authority in executing command and control. Furthermore, the design school suggests  
 
 
                                                 
18 Henry Mintzberg, Bruce Ahlstrand, and Joseph Lampel, Strategy Safari: A Guided Tour through the 
Wilds of Strategic Management, 1st ed. (New York: Free Press, 1998), 5. 
19 Ibid., 24. 
20 Ibid., 32. 
21 Ibid., 38. 
 9 
that environments can be understood, both currently and for a period of time into the 
future. This suggests that strategic plans can be created and executed, definitively; here 
the plan is designed to stand the test of time.  
The planning school was developed during the same time as the design school and 
shares many similarities. The planning, like the design school also relies on the use of the 
SWOT analysis and the setting of objectives on the front end and the elaboration of 
budgets on the back.22  This design model uses goals and strict objectives as a means of 
control. According to Mintzberg, Ahlstrand, and Lampel, the planning model breaks 
down strategies into sub strategies that give rise to an entities set of hierarchies.23  This 
decomposition results in many steps that are the overall responsibility of the chief 
executive officer, broken down into managerial pieces that can easily be controlled. 
The methodology of both the design and planning schools are not designed to 
promote flexibility. In fact, both models create inflexibility. In essence and by design, 
both models are not meant to illicit creativity but set direction. The models are designed 
to allow command and control to remain with the executive leader, and they are tools to 
ensure set objectives are met in accordance with management’s original plan of action. 
By design, there is an understanding that the leader and creator of strategies developed 
under these models has some predetermined understanding of what the future holds, 
allowing him or her the ability to predict the course of the environment or assume its 
stability.24  
The leadership and the individuals of organizations coordinate efforts through 
prescribed standard operating procedures (SOPs) and previously established policy and 
written directives. The culture, SOPs, doctrine, training, and mission of the organization 
are designed to provide skill-sets that allow employees to solve problems using those 
learned and indoctrinated competencies. Therefore, the organization or employee is 
                                                 
22  Mintzberg, Ahlstrand, and Lampel, Strategy Safari, 49. 
23 Ibid., 53. 
24 Ibid., 66. 
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designed or trained to use his or her experience from his or her learned hermeneutic of 
that organization when engaging an issue, problem, or assignment.   
An analogy to describe this phenomenon could be in the varying approach two 
doctors might take in their assessment of a patient experiencing back pain. In one 
instance, a doctor of chiropractic medicine might prescribe a holistic approach to deal 
with the patient where a surgeon would look to address the same issue with a more 
intrusive medical procedure. In both cases, the prescribed prognosis is based on the 
learning, experience, and professional opinion of each physician and his or her 
understanding and approach to patient treatment. Government organization behavior can 
therefore be described as outputs more than deliberate choices because it functions 
according to standard patterns of behavior.25  
In his book, Essence of Decision: Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis, author 
Graham Allison defines an organization as a group of people brought together and 
arranged systematically for harmonious or united action.26  He further describes formal 
organizations as groups of individual human members assembled in regular ways and 
established structures and procedures dividing and specializing labor to perform a 
mission or achieve an objective. The many layers of bureaucracy and closely defined 
roles and responsibilities make it difficult for hierarchical agencies to collaborate in an ad 
hoc manner. As noted by Allison, the formal definition therefore does not include people 
brought together temporarily for a transient purpose.27   
Outcomes of hierarchical organizations are closely defined by specific goals, 
policies, and procedures, which create structure, making it slow to adapt to the changing 
environment. Oftentimes, when change does occur it is in response to a catastrophic 
event (e.g., the events of 9/11, which later resulted in the creation of the Department of 
Homeland Security).   
                                                 
25 Allison and Zelikow, Essence of Decision, 143. 
26 Ibid., 145. 
27 Ibid., 144. 
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Command and control within the hierarchical organization model comes from 
agency leaders who are positioned above all layers of management. In this model, those 
at the top of the “table of organization,” as often referred, are the decision makers and 
therefore have the power to command, set direction, and allocate resources.28  The design 
explains why information flows, as described by Alberts and Hayes29, include collection 
from the bottom up, while directives flow vertically top down. The middle serves to 
mediate, interpret, and ensure information is given and received. In other words, the 
middle pushes and pulls information from top to bottom and bottom to top.   
From the review of the literature a framework for analysis of the case studies was 
developed. The framework includes the following characteristics that impact decision 
makers in hierarchical organizations: the organizational structure and its subsystems; 
authority (command and control); planning; information flows; organizational culture and 
behavior, and SOPs; policy; and governance. In the next section, a review of the literature 
as it relates to the ecosystem environment provides a second framework for analysis of 
the ecosystem model. 
C. ECOSYSTEM ENVIRONMENT   
Using Hawaii as a backdrop to describe the evolution of a self-contained 
biological world, author James Monroe describes how plant and animal life evolved over 
the course of thousands of years.30  The period of ecological stability was drastically 
changed by the arrival of Polynesian voyagers and westerners who introduced animals, 
plants, and insects foreign to that environment, drastically changing the entire ecosystem 
of the island.   
The scientific study of natural ecosystems is not new. The Earth’s biosphere and 
its vast array of complex systems, including the cycles of life and energy, provide insight 
to the natural environment and its ability to adapt, react, and sustain life. This 
phenomenon is one that has garnered the interest of biologists and social scientists for 
                                                 
28 Alberts and Hayes, Power to the Edge, 174. 
29 Ibid. 
30 James Moore, “The Advent of Business Ecosystems,” Upside 7, no. 12 (December 1995): 30. 
 12 
centuries. Some of the characteristics of ecosystems are: diversity, self-organization, 
scalability, non-linear interactions, adaptability, and sustainability. It is these 
characteristics of nature, found in ecosystems, and the successful evolution of organisms 
that has led academics, engineers, and business leaders to use natural ecosystem models 
to better describe and understand the environments in which they study and work. In this 
model, ecosystems are defined as an association of organisms and their physical 
environment, linked by a flow of energy, and a cycling of materials—making them 
complex adaptive systems where organisms may share like characteristics, even though 
their physical properties may differ.31   
Where the homeland security environment was not formally recognized until 
shortly after the events of 9/11, it comes as no surprise that research focusing on the 
environment as a natural, self-organizing, self-adapting community, or as an organization 
with characteristics of an ecosystem is somewhat limited. This review is therefore an 
analysis of the most relevant literature, where research scholars have used the laws of 
nature and the framework of natural ecosystems to demonstrate characteristics of 
ecosystems to create innovative organizational structures to enhance system efficiencies. 
The review starts with a focus on general systems theory (GST), examines literature 
related to digital and business ecosystems, and concludes with the most recent research of 
the homeland security enterprise through an ecosystem perspective. 
Understanding the complexities of nature, science, economics, society, and 
private and public organizations and their interaction with their environment can be 
accomplished through a systems theory approach. The framework for studying problems, 
policies and programs related to complex systems was developed by Ludwig von 
Bertalanffy in what is known today as GST.32  Since its inception, GST provides the 
framework for analysis of complexities as “wholes or systems,” in all fields of  
 
 
                                                 
31 Starr, Biology, 568. 
32 Ludwig von Bertalanffy, General System Theory, rev. ed., 9. printing. (New York: Braziller, 1984). 
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knowledge, which implies a basic re-orientation in scientific thinking. 33  Although 
Bertalanffy published GST in 1969, today GST is used to study various complexities that 
reach beyond a single discipline.   
Bertalanffy notes, “in the study of systems, physical, biological, or sociological 
nature; models, principles, and laws exist which apply to generalized systems irrespective 
of their particular kind.”34  Other structural similarities or isomorphisms suggest that 
GST can be applied to varying fields of study; however, Bertalanffy notes that GST is 
not: 
…a search for vague and superficial analogies. The isomorphism under 
discussion is more than mere analogy. It is a consequence of the fact that, 
in certain respects, corresponding abstractions and conceptual models can 
be applied to different phenomena.35  
GST provides academics with a mechanism to study systems in their entirety, 
within their environment where interdependencies can be studied, rather than first 
reducing the system down to its parts and then analyzing the pieces of the system 
separately. The advantage of this principle is that it can help to solve problems found in 
organizations that result from the interaction or relationship of parts. The application of 
GST to systems in the social sciences demonstrates the utility of GST’s capability to 
reach beyond the complexities of easily quantifiable science.   
Social science, according to Bertalanffy, includes sociology, economics, political 
science, social psychology, and the humanities.36  GST recognizes “science,” not a 
description of singularities but an ordering of facts and elaboration of generalities.37  It 
was Bertalanffy’s opinion that “social science is the science of social systems,” and 
therefore it is appropriate to use GST in understanding systems in social science.38  As 
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sociology includes many diverse fields and studies, from small groups to formal 
organizations, the application of systems theory to problems in government, business, and 
politics demonstrates that it works.39  This proves that GST is not an approach limited to 
material entities. Using GST and the concept of an open-systems approach allows for the 
analysis of human behavior machines, etc.; the inflow of data or material and the system 
out-put, which, in turn, could provide answers to business efficiencies. While Bertalanffy 
continued his research in GST, other scholars embarked on other variations of systems 
theory. 
Where GST has broad applications to various systems, the Tavistock Institute, in 
the late 1940s began the research of group relationships within organizations. This work 
led to the advent of sociotechnical systems theory (SST). The premise of SST is that 
organizations are a combination of technology (tasks, equipment and physical space) and 
social systems (a formal set of relationships among those who do the tasks), where there 
is constant interaction between the two.40  SST takes into account the impact society has 
on individuals, their values, and expectations concerning work roles.41  Conversely, 
technology brings about changes in values, life styles, and communications, which can 
have an impact on society as well. An example of how technology changed this 
interdependency between individuals and the organization can be illustrated through 
technological advances in World War II (WWII). 
During WWII, a new military sociotechnical system appeared in the form of the 
German Panzer Division, which linked man to machine.42  The technology gave 
prominence to small group formations, which led to a paradigm shift in the role of junior 
officers. The studies of sociotechnical systems were being used to develop new 
management philosophies with the ever-changing environment of organizations. 
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In 1965, the Tavistock Institute began a project with Shell Oil to develop a new 
management philosophy to establish values and principles, which would have the 
commitment of all levels of management and the workforce.43  Although the Shell Oil 
project came to an end before completion, much of what was learned was shared, 
mirrored, and implemented by other companies around the world. What followed were 
sociotechnical concepts and methods that become one input into a wider field concerned 
with changing social values and the studying of the effects of values on organizations and 
their individual members.44 The understanding was that industrial societies were 
producing conditions that impoverished workers quality of life. Therefore, the focus was 
the mental health aspects of the workplace, changing social values, and their effects on 
organizations. Other advances with sociotechnical systems theory have led to research 
that provide elements to further the study and integration of social and technical systems. 
Swift advances in technology have created a paradigm shift in the relationships 
between technological and social systems.45  In many organizations technology can be 
described as the lifeline for organization sustainability. As organizations embrace and 
integrate technology into their communication and knowledge-sharing environment, a 
process for integration and design is paramount to the success of the sociotechnical 
system. Thomas Herrmann, Kai-Uwe Loser, and Isa Jahnke, have researched and 
developed a method for integrating social and technical systems.46  Their research 
examines a process they coined as, socio-technical walkthrough (STWT). Hermann et al., 
suggests that technical systems contribution to an organization is predicated on the degree 
of how well organizational and technical structures are adjusted to each other and how 
they are integrated.47  The end goal of STWT is to systematically facilitate  
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communications through workshops to develop a concept of the sociotechnical system 
design. The components, people, tasks, structure, and technology are all considered in the 
STWT.  
Using feedback from collaborative type meetings at all levels within an 
organization, discussion, decision-making, needs, and perspectives are shared.48 The 
process is facilitated using a modeling method, “SeeMe,” where documentation in the 
form of diagrams represents work processes, interdependencies, and their relevance to the 
technical system being designed. One such case study, “A logistic enterprise goes Web” 
implemented the STWT to integrate a mobile communications system to support truck 
drivers and their dispatchers in a logistics company.49  The process required technical 
design and new work-procedures, resulting in representatives of the company, including 
drivers, dispatchers, local management, head office management, and software-engineers, 
to participate in the STWT. In this particular case, STWT proved to be beneficial to the 
organization’s sociotechnical enhancements.   
GST and SST theories provide models for analyzing organizations in their 
entirety, a novel approach that includes influences from interdependencies found in 
complex systems. The models also provide a solution for the integration of technology 
using a holistic philosophy that incorporates all levels of the organization in the design 
and integration phases. The end goal is to improve management and technological 
efficiencies. Other research with technology and complex systems now looks to describe 
technology as a digital ecosystem that mirrors or shares similarities with natural 
ecosystems. In some cases, technological systems are so advanced that they are viewed as 
separate stand-alone systems. 
Some of the early digital ecosystem research compared technological components 
of software and related networks associated with Web services to ecology and biological 
ecosystems. Where network systems provide an excellent example of a complex system  
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and share attributes with natural ecosystems, including evolution, response to change, 
interdependency, and competition, the research was limited in that it did not include 
experiments to validate these claims.50 
Through biomimicry, engineers have been able to draw analogies to complex 
systems to help define system organization and create innovation. The concept is well 
described in the article “Knowledge Sharing in Regional Digital Ecosystems,” in which 
engineers address technological issues of fitness, sustainability, flexibility, and evolution 
using an ecosystem model.51  The modeling of digital ecosystems to biological 
ecosystems can benefit business, commerce, economic enterprises and web based service 
oriented architectures. Although the validation through experimentation is limited, some 
engineers have developed studies that demonstrate that digital ecosystems can in fact be 
tested and perform in a fashion similar to their natural counterparts. 
The work of Gerard Briscoe, Suzanne Sadedin, and Philippe De Wilde 
demonstrates the need for computer technology to meet the demands of today’s end 
users. Their research demonstrates how ecosystem-oriented architectures (EOA) have 
similar characteristics to a natural ecosystem.52 Other research focuses on networking 
solutions for the business industry that mimic a natural ecosystem environment. Where 
the term digital ecosystem has been loosely defined, the analysis presented in this review 
will discuss both the conceptual framework, with similarities to natural ecosystems and 
the artificially created digital ecosystems, where the term ecosystem is more than 
biomimicry.   
The goal of Briscoe et al.’s research is to create digital EOA that mimicked the 
robust, scalable, and self-organizing properties of a natural ecosystem53. By considering 
how the properties of biological ecosystems influence function, researchers were able to 
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identify similar characteristics in developing digital ecosystems, including population 
dynamics, evolution, a complex dynamics, evolution, a complex dynamic environment, 
and spatial distributions for generating local interactions.54   
In work of Briscoe et al., engineers created an EOA, where the components of the 
digital ecosystem replaced or mirrored what would constitute the physical environment, 
and other biotic and abiotic organisms of a biological ecosystem. Agent, agent 
aggregation, habitat, agent migration, population, evolution, fitness, and bloat were all 
characteristics of the architecture.55  Through various experiments, results showed that 
the EOA behaved similar to its biological counterpart, in that the EOA possessed the 
properties of self-organization, scalability, and sustainability.56   
The research of digital ecosystems shows that computer scientists, engineers, and 
academics are cognizant of the impact that technological advances have had on the 
industry, as well as the demands of end users. The result is a complex network of systems 
that demands interoperability, sustainability, fitness, and self-organization from 
technological architectures and software design permitting enhanced efficiencies in the 
digital ecosystem environment. The advances of system theory and digital systems have 
created opportunity for the business sector, where many of the GST and digital system 
characteristics are also prevalent in the business ecosystem. 
As vast advances in technology have created a new, more complex system for the 
technological environment, similar advances, and evolutionary changes in economics 
have forced modern businesses to reconsider how they should interact and adapt to this 
new, more complex, environment. The business industry has been forced to adapt to the 
new dynamic of globalization, multinational corporations, and advances in information 
and knowledge sharing. The result has some academics and business leaders modeling 
business strategies after natural ecosystems, rather than the traditional, linear, hierarchical 
model.   
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Early research suggests that business ecosystems develop in four distinct stages: 
birth, expansion, leadership, and self-renewal—or, if not self-renewal, death.57 Each of 
the stages in this evolution required leaders to create business strategies that are divergent 
from traditional models focused on battling for market share. Contrary to tradition, the 
ecosystem model requires input with customers, suppliers, and other business partners to 
develop innovative solutions, market expansion, vision, and sustainability. This concept 
was not adopted without hesitation, which brings light to the question about the natural 
adaptation that occurs in a natural ecosystem as opposed to the business ecosystem.    
James Moore describes how businesses, during the early 1990s, were hesitant to 
develop strategic plans capable of addressing concepts of “networks of organization and 
trans-industry landscapes of commerce” in his article, “The Advent of Business 
Ecosystems.”58  In describing the current state of the business environment, Moore states, 
“new technologies, business processes and organizational life forms are invading all 
traditional business. They are borne out of the winds of global capital flows and 
managerial migration.”59  The research demonstrates how many former business 
practices became obsolete, leading to a new wave of strategic thinking. As the landscape 
changed, so did traditional market boundaries, thrusting companies into competition with 
rivals that previously competed in other business markets.60 At the time, it was suggested 
that the business model of well-defined industries lacked the foresight to allow businesses 
to adapt to demands, which required novel strategies that could create viable networks 
within the market. Moore emphasizes his vision in stating, “It is more important to see a 
company within its ‘food-chain’ and the food chain as a whole thriving or struggling in a 
wider opportunity environment—than in competition with superficially similar firms 
bundled together in an industry.”61   
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The role of information technology is described as a critical component in the 
business ecosystem. Information technology has become the vehicle for the development 
of business ecosystem opportunities, growth, and innovation.62 Wal-Mart is a prime 
example of how a leading edge company was able to capitalize on networking 
information technology as a service to its supply chain hub. Using a product known as 
Retail Link, Wal-Mart was able to connect to thousands of manufacturers, enhancing 
business relationships, and efficiencies.63  The interdependencies created through the use 
of Retail Link added value to both Wal-Mart and the many suppliers who supplied its 
business. The paradigm shift in business strategy was in the focus—not on internal 
capabilities but the collective properties of networks that supported supply chain 
partners.64  The added complexity of business networks has been used to demonstrate the 
similarities between natural and business ecosystems. Where networks are a focus in 
much of the early literature, more recent studies define other ubiquitous characteristics of 
the business ecosystems and their “natural” counterpart. 
Ecosystem fitness, sustainability, and health are as relevant in natural biology as 
in the metaphoric business paradigm. The measure of “health,” as described by Iansiti, 
includes capabilities with respect to competitors, customers, partners, and suppliers, as 
well as the interactions with the ecosystem as a whole.65  Key to assessing the business 
ecosystem health is: levels of productivity, robustness, and niche creation. Traditional 
business models use the return on invested capital as the metric for measuring 
productivity. However, the business ecosystem approach is more complex, using three 
productivity-related metrics: factor productivity, change in productivity over time, and 
delivery of innovations.66  These complex measurements focus on the business 
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organization and its partner interdependent agents. Robustness and niche creations are 
also considered important factors in measuring ecosystem health and sustainability.  
The literature related to business ecosystems uses the term ecosystem as a 
metaphor, providing business leaders with a heuristic by which business strategies can be 
developed to encourage: creating business networks, metrics to analyze productivity, 
innovation, and niche creation. The research shows similarities between digital 
ecosystems and natural ecosystems. In some literature, digital ecosystems and business 
ecosystems are viewed as separate systems, and in other literature, they are described as 
organisms within the same environment. In some cases, government agencies have made 
in roads to create interdependencies and establish open networked solutions in order to 
solve problems.   
Using the lessons learned from the ecosystem based management philosophy, the 
United States and Canada created interdependencies as well as a greater level of 
connectedness between agencies and leaders. The remedial action plan for restoring the 
polluted Great Lakes, a model with both a philosophical and a contextual approach and 
which required holistic planning, research, and management, provided the requisite 
framework for success.67 According to John Hartig, Michael Zarull, Thomas Heidtke, 
and Hemang Shah, success in ecosystem management requires cooperation and 
collaboration among stakeholders.68  Stakeholders representing diverse social, economic, 
and environmental interests within communities should be involved as equal partners in 
defining needs, and identifying solutions to problems.69  The approach is bottom-up 
requiring leaders to empower and encourage “grass-roots” solutions to problems. 
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Authors Booher and Innes developed a collaborative governance model for 
organizations to follow.70 The platform includes the current practices of hierarchical 
organizations and open collaborative models to deal with the complexity of modern 
problems. Here, the collaborative rationality is not about finding one best solution 
through the resources of one entity, rather the goal is to develop rational processes by 
engaging multiple partners in order to seek a new way forward, while building 
community and governance capacity to face challenges.71   
In the mental model, as it is referred, the heuristics of interaction include: 1) 
obtaining valid information; 2) making informed choices; and 3) assuring internal 
commitment to those choices.72  The use of this model allows for emergence in problem 
solving and learning. As problems, information, and potential solutions are shared there 
is room for flexibility, continued change, refining processes, and resolutions to issues. 
Although limited, there is research and analysis that compares the homeland security 
environment to that of an ecosystem. 
In his book, Learning from the Octopus: How Secrets from Nature Can Help us 
Fight Terrorist Attacks, Natural Disasters, and Disease, Rafe Sagarin shares his insight 
and research of natural ecosystems and the lessons homeland security professionals can 
learn by understanding key characteristics of ecosystems and applying those principles to 
homeland security.73 
Focusing on adaptation, Sagarin describes how agents in natural ecosystems learn 
through experience and then adapt to increase their likelihood of survival. As an example, 
he describes the learned behavior and encoded warning systems in the animals that fled to 
higher ground on December 26, 2004, just hours prior to the tsunami that claimed the 
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lives of 225,000 people across India, Africa, and Southern Asia.74  In comparison, he 
shares another example of the decentralized open environment created by soldiers during 
the Afghanistan war, which led to their novel approach to alter military vehicles, by 
adding armor to increase their protection from improvised explosive devices.75 
Emphasizing the necessity for organizations to exhibit characteristics of a natural 
ecosystem Sagarin quotes Sun Tzu, “A military force has no constant formation, water 
has no constant shape; the ability to gain victory by changing and adapting according to 
the opponent is called genius.”76 
Using the principles of adaptation and learning, Sagarin outlines the methods and 
differences between natural ecosystems and government organizations77. In the analysis, 
government organizations are compared to biological ecosystems, where organizations 
are said to adapt and alter practices based on their changing environment. That however 
is where organizations stray from the natural world to the theoretical constrictions of 
“organizational routines.”78  In nature, changes in the environment lead to emergence, 
organisms learn and adapt in order to survive; in hierarchical organizations the process is 
not always one that derives from emergence but is forced through mechanistic, 
methodological routines, where learning is often cyclical and unnecessary.   
Sagarin further describes how soldiers in Iraq were able to adapt to the threat of 
improvised explosive devices (IEDs).79 However, with each change in tactics, the enemy 
also changed; this phenomenon led to a scenario not uncommon in war, business, and 
natural ecosystems, a game of chess with no-known winner. The soldiers’ experience and 
their decentralized systematic practice of solving problems through novel approaches was 
only one of several contributing factors that minimized the threat to U.S. soldiers. 
According to Sagarin, the keystone variable to maintaining a reduced threat was 
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attributed to the relationships and collaboration between soldiers and civilians from local 
tribes.80 It was these relationships that led to a sharing of information and a rapid decline 
in IED attacks against U.S. soldiers.   
In biology, the relationship between organisms is often defined as symbiotic. 
Symbiosis can be defined as: mutualistic, where both parties benefit; commensalisms, 
where one party benefits and the other is not affected; and parasitic, where one gains and 
the other suffers.81  According to Sagarin: 
…symbiosis creates reactions that are more than just the sum of two 
organisms working together. Symbiosis creates emergent properties that 
you wouldn’t predict from just looking at the two organisms on their own. 
That is to say, symbiosis transforms an organism and transforms the 
environment around the organism. The relationship creates whole 
networks of interactions, builds new habitats for other species to use, and 
even changes the tenor of conflict in the larger ecosystem.82 
Through their studies, research scientists have also discovered how cooperative 
relationships, or “mutualisms,” can produce emergent properties. This research has 
shown that mutualisms are not always balanced, resulting in one party gaining by over 
exploitation.83  These findings demonstrate that as powerful as symbiosis is, it is also 
fallible. 
Throughout the research, the significance of relationships between organisms and 
their impact on ecosystem fitness as well as the impact relationships have in problem 
solving between government agencies is well described. Examples in nature demonstrate 
the need and often the lack of perceived cooperation between organisms. Collaboration 
through symbiotic relationships can result in adaptations and emergence that might not 
otherwise be recognized by an individual organism. 
From a review of the literature a framework used to analyze the research case 
studies was developed. The framework includes: strategic planning, cooperation, 
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collaboration, interdependencies, information flows, diversity, emergence, and networks. 
The following chapter provides an overview of the methodology and a description of the 
research design and analysis. The chapter then describes the New Jersey (NJ) homeland 
security enterprise and then, from that enterprise, both a hierarchal and ecosystem 
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III. METHODOLOGY OVERVIEW 
Qualitative research is the preferred method for this study as it is one of the 
suggested means for understanding complex situations that are often exploratory in 
nature, where observations allow for theory to be built from the ground up.84  
Furthermore, qualitative research methodology is well suited for this research design as 
there are limited studies or literature related to this research question, which asks, “What 
can be learned through a comparative analysis that examines the influence the current 
hierarchical homeland security environment in New Jersey has on decision makers 
relative to an organizational model similar to an ecosystem?”  
A. RESEARCH DESIGN AND ANALYSIS 
The research will analyze the impact the homeland security environment has on 
decision makers through the analysis of two separate lenses. An analysis of New Jersey’s 
homeland security environment will be conducted through two separate case studies 
using the frameworks created through the literature reviews in the hierarchical and 
ecosystem sections.  
The frameworks used for examination of the hierarchical organization 
environment will analyze the characteristics of homeland security agency organizational 
structures and their subsystems, command and control authorities, planning, information 
flows, organizational culture and behavior, SOPs, policy, and governance. The 
framework to examine the ecosystem model will include strategic planning, cooperation, 
collaboration, interdependencies, information flows, diversity, emergence, and networks. 
In both frameworks the analysis will focus on the relationship and impact each 
characteristic has on agency decision makers.   
What follows in section B is an overview of those agencies and their roles within 
the NJ homeland security environment. Subsequent sections then provide a hierarchical 
and ecosystem perspective. 
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B. NEW JERSEY’S HOMELAND SECURITY ENVIRONMENT 
In this section, an overview of the New Jersey homeland security environment is 
provided in three parts. The first section describes how the federal government, post 9/11, 
has influenced the homeland security environment and what that environment looks like 
in the state of New Jersey. The second and third part of the analysis describes New 
Jersey’s homeland security environment from both a hierarchical and an ecosystem 
perspective. In both perspectives, the description of the environment focuses on 
describing key aspects of each framework described in the previous section.   
The analysis starts with a description of the U.S. federal homeland security 
environments. This is critical to the subsequent account of New Jersey’s homeland 
security environment, as the federal model has influenced and required state agencies to 
follow certain practices and develop capabilities that align with federal agencies. Many of 
these requirements came with the acceptance of federal grant dollars. The overview 
includes background information that led to the creation of the Department of Homeland 
Security (DHS), supporting agencies, and the DHS mission, roles, and responsibilities, 
which will set the context for understanding NJ’s homeland security environment.   
One still hears the question asked, “What is homeland security?” Is it a program, 
an objective, a discipline, an agency, an administrative activity, another word for 
emergency management? Is it about terrorism? All hazards? Something completely 
different?85  The research analysis will define the term homeland security as it is applied 
in New Jersey. The definition is key to understanding strategic goals, missions, and 
assignments of the agencies inclusive of NJ’s homeland security environment.   
After 9/11 the nation turned its attention to terrorism and the need to better 
collaborate among local, state, and federal agencies. In the spring of 2003, 
the U.S. DHS was established, with 22 distinct agencies and bureaus and 
more than 180,000 employees. The formation of DHS was a direct 
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at increasing interagency integration, preparation, and responsiveness in 
the increasingly uncertain, complex, and hostile context of terrorist 
threats.86  
The 9/11 Commission Report, published July 2004, recommended significant 
changes in the organization of government, prescribing a unity of effort that would 
integrate intelligence agencies and foster analysis and information sharing.87 
The Homeland Security Strategy (2010) defines the overarching mission and 
objectives for those agencies that fall under the umbrella of the DHS88. It identifies the 
nation’s need to: compete in a global market; proactively identify threats to the 
homeland; and, prevent potential natural and man-made events through proactive 
measures89. It stresses that the “Strategy—as an instrument of achieving national goals—
should aim to put in place the infrastructure, laws, ideas, and capabilities that will enable 
the U.S. to be flexible in adapting to current and unforeseen threats.”90  Within the 
context of the phrase “homeland security,” the strategy is a comprehensive document that 
provides the basis for advancing U.S. interests abroad, the security of the American 
people, economic growth and protection, and a focus on future challenges.   
Where at the federal level the DHS is inclusive of the many agencies responsible 
for the federal homeland security mission, the state of New Jersey includes various state 
entities that serve in the homeland security mission but do not fall under the auspices of a 
single entity similar to the DHS structure. 
In order to understand the dynamic of NJ’s homeland security environment, it is 
imperative to have a full understanding of the agencies or entities that make up the 
homeland security enterprise as well as the structure of those organizations. Richard Daft 
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defines organizations as social entities that are goal-directed, deliberately structured, and 
coordinated activity systems and are linked to the external environment.91  Accordingly, 
organizational construct falls into two dimensions, structural and contextual. The 
structural dimension includes the internal characteristics (i.e., regulations, policy, 
specialization, hierarchy of authority, and centralization). The contextual dimension on 
the other hand is the whole organization, size technology, environment, and culture.92 
The New Jersey Office of Homeland Security and Preparedness (NJ OHSP), 
Office of Emergency Management (OEM), and the Regional Operations Intelligence 
Center (ROIC) are recognized as the primary organizations for homeland security events. 
Subsequent to the following descriptions of the OHSP, OEM, and the ROIC are (Tables 1 
through 4 depicting other supporting agencies that function within the homeland security 
environment. The tables are separated into four cornerstone groups.  
The NJ OHSP was created in March of 2006 through Executive Order 5.93  The 
order empowered the office to administer, coordinate, lead, and supervise New Jersey’s 
counter-terrorism and preparedness efforts. The order states, “The goal of the Office shall 
be to coordinate emergency response efforts across all levels of government, law 
enforcement, emergency management, non-profit organizations, other jurisdictions and 
the private sector, to protect the people of NJ.”94   
Since its inception, the OHSP has become the state lead agency for counter-
terrorism and homeland security preparedness efforts and the state coordinator of what 
the homeland security strategy describes as the “homeland security enterprise.”95  To 
fulfill this mission, the OHSP consists of two divisions, the Division of Operations and 
the Division of Preparedness. The Office is also designated as the State Administrative 
Agency (SAA) for all federal homeland security and preparedness funding. 
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The NJ OEM was established in December 1980 by Governor’s Executive Order 
101.96  The executive order established the office within the New Jersey Division of State 
Police, Department of Law and Public Safety. The Superintendent of the New Jersey 
State Police (NJSP) holds the title Colonel as well as Director of the OEM, giving him 
direct reporting responsibility to both the Attorney General as Colonel and the Governor 
as Director of OEM. The NJ OEM falls within the Emergency Management Section, 
Homeland Security Branch of the Division of State Police. The section is comprised of 
three bureaus: Recovery, Response, and Communications. With the establishment of the 
OEM, the Office is responsible for coordination of all federal and state natural disaster 
assistance operations and resources as well as the enforcement authority of defense and 
emergency policies, laws, rules, and regulations. The NJ OEM organizes, staffs, and 
coordinates activities of the State Emergency Operations Center (SEOC), facilitating the 
flow of information among the 21 county OEMs and state and allied agencies. The NJ 
OEM is also responsible for coordinating development of the State Emergency 
Operations Plan. The bureaus that make up the Emergency Management Section (EMS) 
are subdivided further into units that have various responsibilities. 
Key units within the EMS include the Radiological Emergency Response 
Planning and Training Unit (RERP&T), the Urban Search and Rescue Unit (USAR), and 
the Emergency Response Bureau, Regional Units. The RERP&T Unit is responsible for 
the planning, training, and exercising of all first responders, municipal, and county 
officials within the 10-mile radius of the state’s two nuclear facilities. The Unit is also 
responsible for the dissemination of more than one million dollars in funding to RERP&T 
agencies to support their preparedness efforts. The USAR Unit includes more than 200 
first responders from around the state who train and support the unit during significant 
incidents that are beyond local control. All members are trained in the various skill sets 
necessary to meet the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), USAR 
standards. Also significant to the EMS is the Emergency Response Bureau’s Regional 
Units. Members of the regional units are trained and equipped to liaison with county 
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http://www.state.nj.us/njoem/press_emhistory.html (accessed November 20, 2012). 
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offices of emergency management in their prevention, preparedness, response, and 
recovery efforts. Representatives work directly in county emergency operations centers 
when activated to assist in all facets of response and recovery operations. 
In 2006, the state of New Jersey formed the New Jersey Regional Operations 
Intelligence Center Task Force and opened the doors to its first fusion center, the “NJ 
ROIC.” The NJ ROIC, whose foundation is the intelligence-led policing model, is a 
collective effort of multiple agencies that provide resources, expertise, and information to 
maximize the state’s ability to detect, prevent, investigate, and respond to all crimes and 
hazards that may impact the state. The governance and oversight of the NJ ROIC, which 
includes a body of executive-level homeland security professionals, provides the basis for 
the many interorganizational partnerships that support NJ ROIC activities. The 
governance committee ensures that goals and strategies are developed through 
interagency collaboration while adhering to federal and state laws. All intelligence 
activities associated with information sharing remain consistent with the National 
Criminal Intelligence Sharing Plan, ensuring the protection of the privacy, civil rights, 
and civil liberties of individuals and organizations.97 
The NJ ROIC consists of three major components: the Intelligence Watch and 
Warning Unit, the Analysis and Intelligence Unit, and the Fusion Liaison Intelligence and 
Training Unit. The Intelligence Watch and Warning Unit serves as the central notification 
point for all emergent operations throughout the state and also provides tactical 
information and intelligence through the utilization of a number of federal and state 
databases. The Analysis and Intelligence Unit serves as the intelligence analysis 
component, housing analysts and law enforcement officers from various federal and state 
agencies. Organized into two main program areas—threat analysis and crime analysis—
these analysts and officers contribute to a wide range of intelligence products related to 
crime and homeland security, following an “all-threats, all-hazards, all-crimes” approach.   
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The Fusion Liaison Intelligence and Training Unit’s primary responsibility is to share 
information with the private sector, including non-classified briefings related to potential 
homeland security threats. 
Table 1.   Group 1: NJ Organizations with Homeland Security as a Primary Mission 
 New Jersey Office of Homeland 
Security and Preparedness (OHSP) 
 NJ OHSP Infrastructure Advisory 
Committee (IAC) 
 New Jersey State Police  Urban Search and Rescue (USAR)  
 New Jersey Regional Operations 
Intelligence Center (ROIC) 
 NJ County and Local Offices of 
Emergency Management 
 New Jersey Office of Emergency 
Management (OEM) including 
volunteer programs. 
 Urban Area Security Initiative 
(UASI), Bergen, Essex, Hudson, 
Middlesex, Morris Passaic and 
Union county members 
 NJ Department of Military and 
Veterans Affairs (DMAVA) 
 Emergency Medical Services Task 
Force (EMSTF) 
 NJ Domestic Security Preparedness 
Task Force (DSPTF) 





Table 2.   Group 2: Non-NJ Organizations with Homeland Security as a Primary 
Mission 
 Regional Catastrophic Planning Group 
(RCPG): A consortium of NJ, NY, 
NYC, PA, and CT focused on creating 
plans and policies for response to large 
scale disasters affecting the four-state 
region. 
 Utilities/Critical Infrastructure 
Organizations: Public and Private 
Sector organizations providing core 
functions or Lifeline Functions (i.e., 
gas, water, electricity).  
 
 Federal Emergency Management 
Agency (FEMA): NJ falls within 
FEMA Region II and coordinates with 
FEMA’s designated Region II 
representatives predominantly through 
the NJ Office of Homeland Security 
and during emergencies, through the NJ 
Office of Emergency Management. 
 
 U.S. Department of Health and Senior 
Services Assistant Secretary for 
Preparedness and Response 
(HHS/ASPR) and Centers for Disease 
Control and Prevention. HHS/ASPR 
provides health and medical Regional 
Emergency Coordinators who liaison 
predominantly with the NJ Department 
of Health and Senior Services. 
 
 U.S. Department of Homeland Security 
Critical Infrastructure, Office of Health 
Affair, and Science and Technology 
Directorate.  (DHS CI/OHA/S&T): 
Organizations that support NJ 
homeland security through cooperative 
programs, funding, or research. 
 
 Joint Terrorism Task Force (JTTF): 
FBI, DHS components such as U.S. 
Coast Guard, U.S. Immigration and 
Customs Enforcement, U.S. Customs 
and Border Protection, the 
Transportation Security Administration, 
and the U.S Secret Service. 
 Department of Defense (DoD): Active 
Duty (Title 10 Forces) and National 
Guard forces. 
 
 U.S. Department of Homeland Security 
Operational Assets (U.S. Coast Guard, 
Immigration and Naturalization, 
Customs and Borders, TSA etc.). 
 NYC and Philadelphia Offices of 
Emergency Management. 
 
 Non-Governmental Organizations 






Table 3.   Group 3: Organizations with Homeland Security Functions or Programs 
 NJ state agencies including Department 
of Health and Senior Services, 
Department of Environmental 
Protection, Board of Public Utilities, 
Department of Transportation, NJ 
Transit, Department of State, 
Department of Agriculture, Office of 
the Attorney General, Department of 
Education, and others. 
 The U.S. Department of Homeland 
Security Command, Control, and 
Interoperability Center for Advanced 
Data Analysis located at Rutgers 
University 
 NJ Preparedness College Consortium: 
Rutgers University, Richard Stockton 
College, NJ Institute of Technology, 
University of Medicine and Dentistry of 
New Jersey, Fairleigh Dickinson 
University, Monmouth University, 
Princeton University, Stevens Institute 
of Technology. 
 County/ local government agencies 
including, law enforcement, fire, county 
prosecutors, and emergency medical 
service coordinators. 
 Major corporations  Special interest groups 
 National laboratories  NY/NJ Port Authority 
 
Table 4.   Group 4: Organizations with Homeland Security Interests 
 Community leaders  Academic programs  
 Business community  Major Convention Center/sports 
arenas/malls/amusement parks 
 New Jersey League of Municipalities  
 
In the following two sections, 1 and 2, a hierarchical and ecosystem analysis of 
New Jersey’s homeland security environment is presented. 
1. Hierarchical Analysis 
Much of the structure, bureaucracy, and hierarchical development of today’s 
governmental organizations can be traced back to the classical perspectives of the 
organizational model developed during the Industrial Revolution. The mechanistic style 
of this model tends to be very specialized and has many written rules—a tall order of 
hierarchy and clear understanding of the organizations rules and regulations and well-
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defined goals.98  It is not by coincidence therefore that the command and management 
structure for homeland security emergency response activities includes a well-defined 
hierarchical structure. Today, that organizational structure is well ingrained in the 
Incident Command System (ICS). 
On February 28, 2003, President George W. Bush issued Homeland Security 
Presidential Five (HSPD-5), which directs the Secretary of Homeland Security to develop 
and administer a National Incident Management System (NIMS).99  The purpose of the 
directive was to develop a system for government and non-government organizations to 
work in an integrated approach in preparedness, prevention, response, and recovery 
incidents. According to DHS, “The NIMS represents a core set of doctrine, concepts, 
principles, terminology, and organizational processes to enable effective, efficient, and 
collaborative incident management at all levels.”100  One of the components of NIMS is 
the ICS, which defines the operation attributes and management structure that 
organizations will adopt for command and control of any incident. It is a system designed 
to enable effective and efficient incident management with a common organizational 
design.101  ICS is designed to be to be used for all events.  
Where the design of the ICS includes a single commanding officer, the model 
mirrors that of a traditional hierarchical organization. The incident commander has 
overall authority and responsibility of the incident. The hierarchical structure of the ICS 
is managed by objectives, which are established, approved, and directed under the 
coordination of the incident commander. The incident commander can perform any, all, 
or designate to others, the associated management responsibilities of the ICS. The ICS 
structure includes an operations section, planning section, logistics section, and a 
finance/administration section. 
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Following the hierarchical model, the state of New Jersey created and empowered 
the NJ Office of Homeland Security and Preparedness (OHSP) as the responsible 
authority for developing the state’s homeland security strategy. The strategy is a top 
down hierarchical planning model that includes the New Jersey’s homeland security 
vision statement, which is:  
A safe, secure and well prepared New Jersey. The mission is to ensure that 
New Jersey is prepared to prevent and mitigate, to the fullest extent 
possible, the spectrum of destructive and injurious consequences resulting 
from manmade or naturally occurring catastrophic events and emergencies 
that have the potential to harm our state and nation.102  
As described in the strategy, a considerable amount of guidance for the homeland 
security strategy is derived from the federal government: National Preparedness Goal, 
National Response Framework, National Infrastructure Protection Program, National 
Preparedness Guidance, and Target Capability List.   
Using an all-hazards and terrorism risk assessment, the OHSP focused on threats, 
consequences, and vulnerabilities when developing the state’s security strategy. The 
culmination of the threat analysis and supporting documents helps to define the term 
homeland security. The strategy defines homeland security as: 
Homeland Security: for New Jersey is meant to define an all hazards 
approach to state security that goes beyond acts of terrorism. Within our 
definition of Homeland Security is the deterrence of man-made acts to 
include acts of terrorism as well as industrial accidents that could imperil 
the health and safety of New Jersey citizens. Homeland Security also 
includes within its definition the planning, preparation and response to 
acts of nature such as hurricanes, wildfires and flooding.103  
The framing of the homeland security environment includes a combination of the 
Homeland Security and New Jersey Office of Emergency Management Assessments. The 
environment includes terrorist, natural disaster, health, and environmental and industrial 
threats to New Jersey. The strategy not only identifies the threats the state must prevent, 
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Homeland Security and Preparedness, West Trenton, NJ, 2012). 
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prepare, respond, recover, and mitigate but also the agencies responsible for leading the 
mission. 
Additionally, leaders of many of the organizations within the homeland security 
environment develop separate agency strategic plans. The plans are often developed at 
the highest levels within the organization and then passed down to subordinates, who are 
responsible for accomplishing strategic objectives.   
Within each of the agencies in the homeland security environment command and 
control is established through a hierarchy where agencies are broken into subsets often 
identified as bureaus or units. Control and efficiencies are created through organization 
design, standing operating procedures (SOPs), and agency defined roles and 
responsibilities. The specialized function of individual units within many agencies creates 
mission specific capable abilities with a narrowly focused set of responsibilities. Under 
this construct, patrol, investigations, and administrative functions are examples of how 
some law enforcement agencies in New Jersey function. The hierarchy and specialization 
of units allow commanders to quickly identify and allocate resources. The individual 
agencies subsequently share information through the agency chain of command. The 
specialization and individualization established through hierarchies influences agency 
culture.   
Efficiencies are another common characteristic of government agencies. Where 
government agencies are not driven by a bottom line the same way business is in the 
private sector; however, customers (citizens) demand that agencies operate efficiently 
and with clear objectives and under strict direction from management. This demand 
results in efficiencies, which in turn can limit creativity. This can lead agencies to 
develop and strive for ideal solutions to ensure their decisions meet public expectations. 
Where the structure of the organization is one example of how agencies create 
efficiencies, there are still other noteworthy organizational behaviors in the hierarchical 
model. 
Control and efficiencies are often created through organization design, standing 
operating procedures (SOPs), and agency strategies. The specialized functions of 
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individualized units create mission specific capabilities with a narrowly focused set of 
responsibilities. Under this construct, the silos created allow leaders to quickly identify 
and allocate resources in a way not practical under a linear agency model.   
In this analysis, culture is defined as, “the set of values, norms, guiding beliefs, 
and understandings that is shared by members of an organization and taught to new 
members as the correct way to think, feel, and behave. It represents the unwritten, feeling 
part of the organization.”104  The NJ Homeland Security Environment includes a 
multitude of individualized agencies, each with their own identity and culture. The 
culture of an organization can strongly influence leaders and shape the behavior of 
individuals within the organization to conform to norms, creating an identity specific to 
the organization.105   
The New Jersey homeland security environment has also created hierarchy within 
various committees, including the Domestic Security Preparedness Task Force and the 
ROIC governance board. Both groups are regulated, one through a set of policy by-laws 
and the other through a governors executive order. Leaders over see each group, where 
goals, objectives, and homeland security strategies are established.   
Where this section provided an analysis of the New Jersey homeland security 
environment from a hierarchical perspective, the next section will analyze the same 
environment using the ecosystem framework. 
2. Ecosystem Analysis 
With the creation of a national homeland security environment and subsequent 
homeland security environment in the state of New Jersey, the addition of new 
government entities, policies, and practices led to enhancements that have created 
similarities to natural ecosystems. The term ecosystem, used, as an isomorphism is 
therefore an appropriate depiction in describing many of the characteristics found in the 
New Jersey homeland security environment. Therefore, the analysis focuses on the 
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following key characteristics, collaboration, interdependencies, information flows, 
diversity, emergence, networks, and strategic planning.   
In 2003, President George W. Bush issued Homeland Security Presidential 
Directive Five.106  The directive established the National Incident Management System. 
One component of NIMS is the use of ICS. Where the design of the ICS allows for the 
use of multiple commanders or a unified command, when used in that variation, 
command is shared between two or more department or agency leaders. The approach to 
unified command enhances collaboration and creates an additional level of 
interdependency between agencies. Where the adoption of the federal NIMS led to one 
example of collaboration between agencies, the state of New Jersey promoted yet other 
forms of collaboration through the creation of the OHSP. 
The OHSP, the responsible authority for developing the state’s homeland security 
strategy includes an all threats, all hazards approach that includes prevention, 
preparedness, response, recovery, and mitigation efforts with a “whole” of government 
approach. The strategy addresses the need for government and private sector 
collaboration. A similar strategy developed by the New Jersey Office of Emergency 
Management takes a similar approach; it also includes the collective force of all 
participating agencies in the state’s emergency operations plan to collaborate in reaching 
the plans desired goals. 
With the creation of the NJ ROIC, more than 20 county, state, and federal 
agencies have participated and supported the vision and mission of the state’s fusion 
center. Where the primary objective of the ROIC is to be the point of information sharing 
for the state, an untold number of agencies have contributed to its success. The fusion 
center creates collaboration and enhances information sharing through its production of 
more than 15,000 messages and 1,600 intelligence products produced annually.107  
Furthermore, the ROIC’s governance board includes a diverse membership of 
government leaders and the private sector creating a homeland security network.   
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Chapter III included an overview of the research methodology and the research 
design, which included the framework for case study analysis. The chapter also included 
a description of those agencies that included in the NJ homeland security environment, 
followed by a hierarchical and ecosystem analyses focusing on those characteristics that 
encompass the analysis framework. In Chapter IV provides an overview of the two case 
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IV. DATA COLLECTION 
The case studies used for this research will be the primary source of data for the 
analysis. The two case studies, the National Socialist Movement protest of April 16, 2011 
and the on-going Route 21 Corridor Violent Crime Suppression Initiative were chosen 
primarily for two reasons. Each case had a level of complexity that required the inclusion 
of local, state, and federal agencies in support of event objectives. Each case could also 
be described as events with a homeland security nexus and fell within the purview of the 
New Jersey state homeland security environment. The two cases presented include the 
most accurate depiction available using internal agency and open source documents.    
A. THE NATIONAL SOCIALIST MOVEMENT RALLY 
1. Background 
On December 10, 2010, the Chief of Staff of the National Socialist Movement 
(NSM), Jason Heicke applied for a “permit to gather” for a political demonstration with 
the state of New Jersey. According to initial reports, the NSM expected between 75 and 
150 members of the organization to participate in the rally, with an additional 1000 to 
3000 counter protestors.108  The date to protest was set for April 16, 2011. As the event 
was believed to potentially cause unrest and possible civil disorder with other organized 
political groups or counter protesters, a detailed security plan was developed. The plan 
required input from various agencies in order to ensure appropriate consideration was 
given to identify potential security issues and threats against the NSM protesters. 
In the initial phases of planning the NJ State Police (NJSP), Troop C, Region III, 
Office of State Governmental Security, began to collect information and intelligence on 
the NSM. This information would be used to ensure their event planning initiatives would 
provide a full scope of background information on the group in order to maximize the 
safety and security of the protesters and their potential adversaries.   
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As the Office of State Governmental Security began to plan for this event, it 
identified the need to include multiple agencies at the federal, state, and local level to 
support its efforts. Collaboration between other NJSP agencies including, Field 
Operations, Special Operations, Emergency Management, Office of Attorney General, 
and the NJ Regional Operations and Intelligence Center (ROIC), including the FBI, and 
the U.S. Dept. of Justice, along with the Dept. of Corrections, Mercer County Sheriffs 
Dept., Trenton Police Dept., Trenton Fire Dept., the American Red Cross, and Salvation 
Army.   
Through a series of meetings members of the NJSP developed a descriptive 
operational plan with input from partner agencies. The NJSP were identified as the lead 
agency in charge and worked with other agency commanders in the collection of 
intelligence and information sharing. As planning progressed, the operations plan became 
more complex requiring agencies to identify the resources that they would use to support 
the event.   
Using available resources through New Jersey’s Fusion Center, the ROIC, 
intelligence products were developed and shared with planners. It was learned that the 
NSM membership was approximately 300 to 350 members nationwide with 
approximately 10 members living in New Jersey.109  Research also revealed that the 
NSM is one of the largest “neo-Nazi” organizations in the United States. Initial reports 
suggested that the rally would attract between 1000 and 3000 counter protestors.110  The 
counter protestors were believed to be from organized groups, such as the Anti-Racist 
Action (ARA), the New Black Panther Party, and One People’s Project groups.111  It was 
also learned that groups who had protested the NSM in other venues often used violence 
and caused civil unrest.112  The tactics used by protesters were of concern to law 
enforcement as is was not an uncommon for them to use rocks, bottles, pepper spray, and 
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feces or urine filled balloons as projectiles.113  In 2005, 600 protesters engaged in arson, 
criminal mischief, aggravated assault, theft, and civil disorder during an NSM rally in 
Toledo, Ohio.114   
2. Concept of Operations 
Based on the type and scope of event, a concept of operations was developed to 
create an organized command and control structure to support all required activities. The 
organizational structure was developed using the ICS model and written so as to ensure 
span of control, resources, information sharing, and tactical operations would be 
adequately supported.  
The concept of operations consisted of seven parts: pre-event, event, special 
operations group (SOG) operations, audio visual, evacuation planning, public information 
staging, and post event. Each of the program areas was briefly described in the concept of 
operations manual and the incident commanders, prior to the start of the first operational 
shift briefed all associated parties.   
The pre-event phase of the operation addressed staging for NSM members, 
viewing for protestors, and the specific objectives required to ensure the groups would 
not have access to one another. Staging areas were also designated for counter protesters 
with identified ingress and egress routes to allow control of individual movements of all 
protesters and observers. Perimeter control was considered as well as control of all 
rooftop access for law enforcement observation. Other pre-event considerations included, 
the placement for medical, logistics, communications, command, the placement of 
signage, and hour of operations for the incident command post. 
The event section described places and times of operation for designated first 
responders including, NJSP Field Operations, Technical Emergency and Mission 
Specialists (SWAT), law enforcement investigators, and the Dept. of Corrections  
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personnel. Also detailed is the planned route and arrival of NSM members who were 
transported to the site from another location previously determined by the Chief of Staff 
of the NSM and NJSP commanders.   
Other portions of the concept of operations provided similar information relative 
to the specific assignment and personnel required to fulfill that mission. The concept of 
operations was inclusive of all necessary activities related to the event and potential 
consequences of the event scheduled for April 16, 2011. An organizational structure and 
assignment list was also developed to correlate specific assignments with personnel. 
The organizational structure or table of organization developed for this event 
followed the basic principles of the ICS. At the incident command and staff level, two 
members of the NJSP were assigned as incident commanders qualifying as a “unified 
command.”  The core areas of the organization consisted of a planning, logistics, 
operations, and finance section. Some of those sections were further broken down into 
branches and groups. In total, more than 300 troopers and other first responders were 
detailed to this assignment.   
To support the planning for this event, command staff members used the NJ 
ROIC for its capability of providing information and intelligence related to the NSM and 
those groups that might protest the rally. Products developed by the ROIC Analytical 
Element Unit, provided background information on the NSM, pre-rally organized 
engagements, and the predicted number of people and times counter protesters might 
arrive at the rally site. Based on similar meetings and rallies associated with the NSM, 
analysts were able to provide some understanding of what law enforcement might expect 
in terms of weapons and methods of violence or disruption protesters might take. 
3. The Event/Operations 
Although not included in the operations plan the day prior to the protest, NSM 
members gathered for a meeting in Pemberton Borough, New Jersey, which is 
approximately 25 minutes from Trenton, their pre-selected demonstration site. During the 
meeting, which took place in a local church, members of the ARA gathered around the 
meeting place and enticed several of the NSM into a confrontation. The altercation 
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between the two groups quickly manifested itself beyond the capabilities of the local 
police. Pemberton Borough Police requested assistance from the state police who 
responded in force. After securing the scene, the NSM members were escorted by law 
enforcement to another town where they planned to stay the night in a local hotel.  
Several members of the NSM were injured during the altercation and were transported to 
the local hospital for treatment and members of the ARA were arrested.  
Analysis of the plans for the NSM event did not disclose information or other 
planning objectives that focused on the NSM events the night prior to the event. Law 
enforcement officials at all levels of government appear to have been unaware of the 
potential for the events of April 15. The local police indicated that they were unaware of 
the NSM’s plans to congregate in their jurisdiction and the documented plans for the 
event did not indicate awareness of the pre-event either.   
However, open source media sites were well aware of the events the NSM 
planned and even encouraged others to demonstrate by “call blocking,” as referred to on 
the San Francisco Bay area Independent Media Center website.115  The website provided 
detailed information about the meeting and scheduled rally at the Trenton State House the 
following day. The Independent Media Center site provided detailed information 
regarding the April 15 NSM rally in Pemberton Borough, and it encouraged followers to 
show their distaste for the NSM by calling the hotel and other locations. Based on what is 
known from the plans associated with the event, it is difficult to determine if it could 
have been prevented. However, by questioning the planning process, we might learn 
more about the leaders’ decision-making process while preparing for this event. 
The planning efforts that led to the eventual operations associated with the NSM 
included the deployment of more than 500 NJ State Troopers and additional support from 
local, county, state, and federal agencies. The written plans were created as a strategy for  
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all security and intelligence strategies associated with the event scheduled for April 16, 
2011. However, an incident prior to the event did force an unexpected response from law 
enforcement, for which they were not prepared.   
On April 15, 2011, NSM members gathered for a meeting in Pemberton Borough 
NJ, approximately 25 minutes from the NJ State House in Trenton City where the rally 
scheduled for April 16 would take place. During the meeting, members of the Anti-
Racist-Action group (ARA) confronted NSM members and a conflict ensued. Local 
police were quickly outnumbered and were forced to rely on assistance from other local 
and NJSP resources. The conflict between the two groups resulted in six NSM members 
being transported to a local hospital for assault related injuries, as well as the arrest of 
two ARA members. NSM members had to be escorted and provided security from their 
meeting place to their pre-booked hotel. 
On April 16, the NJ State Emergency Operations Center (SEOC) was activated to 
support the NSM operations. The SEOC was staffed with personnel from the NJ OEM. A 
command post was established in Trenton City where all command-related decisions 
were executed. Pre-defined plans or incident action plans were closely followed to ensure 
continuity in operations. All participating agency personnel were briefed by supervisors 
prior to being deployed to their assigned area of responsibility. 
The plans for controlling group movements included barricaded roadways and 
complete control of ingress and egress to the city of Trenton. All interested protestors or 
visitors were directed to one area where they were permitted to park their vehicles. 
Observers were then directed through several different checkpoints where they were 
provided specific instructions that forbid the carrying of bags, backpacks, or signs. Once 
past the various security checkpoints, observers were directed to locations where they 
would be permitted to listen and respond to the rally.   
As people started to gather in the city of Trenton to either observe or protest the 
NSM rally, intelligence was gathered from various law enforcement sources and shared 
with commanders. Initial intelligence reports indicated that members of the ARA and 
Black Panthers were within close proximity to the State House, and members of the Hells 
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Angels outlaw motorcycle gang were expected to arrive at some point during the rally. 
Other intelligence reports stated that members of the One People Project group (a counter 
protest group) were intending on meeting at the Trenton Battle Monument, which is 
adjacent to the State House Complex prior to gathering in the rally area.   
At 10:00 a.m., the NJ OEM published and distributed the first of two situation 
reports related to the NSM event. The situation report, which was authored by NJ OEM 
staff from the SEOC, included information assembled through direct information feeds 
from the command post in Trenton.116  The report included an overview or current 
synopsis, incidents, resources deployed, activities, and weather conditions. 
At 12:00 p.m., NSM members boarded Department of Corrections Busses and 
were escorted by NJSP to the State House in Trenton. As information and intelligence 
was received from the field to the command post, commanders were able to reassign and 
adjust tactical plans associated with the event. The information learned by plainclothes 
law enforcement along with observations from air support (state police helicopters) and 
tactical deployments of NJSP Tactical Emergency and Mission Specialists (TEAMS) 
from roof top positions was helpful by allowing law enforcement to stop advances of 
protesting groups whose intentions were to gain access to NSM members. The tactics 
deployed during the event proved to quell the intentions of anti-protestors from disrupting 
the NSM rally.    
By 2:35 p.m., the NSM rally had concluded; all NSM members boarded the state 
provided transportation and were escorted back to their personal transportation parked at 
a nearby hotel where they had spent the previous night. In total, two arrests for disorderly 
persons offenses were made during the course of the day’s event. 
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B. STRATEGY FOR SAFE STREETS AND NEIGHBORHOODS AND THE 
PASSAIC RIVER VIOLENT CRIME REDUCTION INITIATIVE 
1. Background 
New Jersey Governor Jon Corzine developed and delivered his Strategy for Safe 
Streets and Neighborhoods in the fall of 2007.117  The impetus behind the strategy was 
an increase in murder and weapons possession cases. The report noted that 43 percent of 
the state’s municipalities recognize the presence of criminal gang activity and attribute 
much of the violent crime to gang members.118  The strategy was designed to focus on 
three distinct areas to address violent crime: enforcement, prevention, and reentry. The 
focus was on six communities: Asbury Park, Camden City, Newark, Paterson, Trenton, 
and Vineland. The plan called for the development of a Prevention Policy Board for each 
community that would include members from state, local, and the private sector to assist 
in developing policy to ensure cities could “connect the dots” in terms of understanding 
the entire picture of risk and protective factors to address crime-related issues. 
The first goal, enforcement, included several action items that focus on law 
enforcement capabilities to assess and develop new technology to assist with crime 
fighting initiatives. The first action within goal number one required a continued 
assessment of gang related crime and suggested that law enforcement coordinate 
investigations.119 It creates a violent crime coordinator from the NJ Attorney General’s 
Office and identifies the ROIC as the collection point for gang-related information and 
analysis of crimes involving the use of a firearm. Also listed, as an action item under the 
first goal is the acknowledgement and requirement of community involvement, 
suggesting that active participation of the community in identifying neighborhood 
concerns will lead to enhanced communication, which could prevent crime.120   
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The second goal, prevention, includes an overall safe streets strategy. The first 
action focused on state agencies, suggesting that collectively they have dedicated 35.6 
million dollars towards collaborative coordinated funding and implementation of 
preventative programs121. The action items under this goal created a prevention 
coordinator (appointed by the Attorney General) and a prevention-funding guide.   
The third goal, reentry, focused on recidivism reduction. The actions related to 
this goal supported the creation of a Reentry Coordinating Council, a reentry 
“Demonstration Project,” increased support for youth returning from juvenile justice 
institutions, and the relief of impediments for persons who establish rehabilitation.122 
Finally, the responsibility of oversight and accountability was assigned to a newly 
created accountability structure, led by the Governor’s Oversight Committee for Safe 
Streets and Neighborhoods.123  The structure of the committee included state agency 
executive leaders, as well as members from the public sector, and co-chairs of the 
Statewide Association of the County Youth Service Commission. An additional layer of 
coordinating councils was established to ensure collaboration and coordination existed 
between agencies. The three councils, law enforcement, prevention, and reentry were 
tasked with oversight of implementation and evaluation of strategic goals. 
Then, in early 2008, a spike of violent crime in an area of New Jersey that has 
become known as the Passaic River Corridor led law enforcement agencies to collaborate 
and identify appropriate measures to thwart criminal activity. Since that time, federal, 
state, and local agencies have coordinated plans to accomplish a number of initiatives. 
Some initiatives required human resources, and others required intelligence analysis and 
the development of technological solutions, allowing agencies to communicate and share 
information in that regional. All of this has the purpose of reducing crime, while creating 
a better quality of life for residents. 
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Analysts were asked to study criminal data in individual communities to identify 
potential interdependencies between neighboring cities and towns. Through their 
analysis, they noted that the demographics and geography of the state contributed to 
cross-jurisdictional issues with crime.124  New Jersey, the most densely populated state 
creates a unique opportunity for the criminal element. To further complicate issues, the 
robust and intricate network of interstate and state highways provided the ideal conditions 
for criminal offenders to conduct illegal activities in multiple locations throughout the 
region. Analysis showed a significant number of violent crimes were being committed 
along the Route 21 corridor on a regular basis.125  The area included four suburban 
municipalities, 32 urban suburbs, and six urban centers. In that region, all but one of the 
42 Passaic Corridor cities are more densely populated than the state as a whole. The high 
levels of poverty and unemployment in that area were also believed to be contributing 
factors to the high crime rates. Of the 42 municipalities, 26 acknowledge the presence of 
gangs in their communities.126  Furthermore, the Route 21 Corridor region included only 
16.9 percent of the state population but could account for 31.6 percent of the violent 
crime, including 43 percent of the state murders and non-negligible manslaughters, 34.5 
percent of the robberies, and 47.3 percent of all vehicle thefts.127  The high crime activity 
plaguing the area led to the creation of the Route 21 Corridor violent crime initiative. 
2. The Initiative 
In May of 2008, the New Jersey ROIC developed a concept paper entitled The 
Passaic River Corridor Information Analysis and Exchange Program.128 The premise 
was to develop an information-sharing environment between municipal police agencies 
along the Passaic River corridor.129  The impetus behind the initiative was the murder of 
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Paterson Police Officer Tyron Franklin, a 23-year-old rookie who was shot in a local 
restaurant while off duty. During the initial investigation, the leads in the murder of 
Franklin were quickly exhausted. Paterson Police Department officials believed the 
suspected shooter was not a resident of the city but could be a resident of a neighboring 
community. Eventually police learned the suspect was in fact a resident of Irvington, a 
city that connects with Paterson via Route 21.130 The circumstances of this crime 
stimulated the Director of the Paterson Police Department, Mike Walker, to conduct an 
analysis of the municipalities along the Passaic River Corridor, which yielded some 
interesting findings. The research showed that a percentage of violent crime was taking 
place in and around those jurisdictions adjacent to Route 21, which connects numerous 
municipalities between Essex and Passaic counties.131  Shortly after that time, law 
enforcement at the local and state level started the process of discussing potential 
information sharing opportunities to assist in quelling crime in that region. 
Between 2008 and 2012, a number of meetings were held and plans developed to 
meet the objectives of this initiative. Some of the plans included technological initiatives 
that were to be supported through grant funding to assist in the information sharing 
process; others included inter-agency collaboration with operations leading to multiple 
arrests for weapons, controlled dangerous substances, warrant, and fugitive arrests.132 
In 2009, the cities of Paterson, Passaic, Newark, along with the ROIC and the 
New Jersey Urban Area Security Initiative (UASI), joined to start a pilot that would 
enable sharing of crime statistics and other crime related information across 
jurisdictions.133  More than 100 users in 43 jurisdictions across three counties along with 
the New Jersey State Police participated in the program.134  Information sharing products 
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focused primarily on shootings, robberies, burglaries, automobile, and organized retail 
theft.135  The concept behind the pilot was to develop a robust technological solution 
capable of providing efficiencies, including analytics.    
In June of 2011, the Passaic County Prosecutor’s Office submitted a Bureau of 
Justice grant application requesting funding to support the information sharing platform 
and infrastructure needed to allow law enforcement agencies to receive and submit “real 
time” criminal case information. Recognizing the limitations of information sharing 
systems, the grant application focused on the development of a technical solution that 
would provide features and data sharing capabilities not available elsewhere. In 
September 2011, the U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ), through the DOJ’s National 
Justice Information Sharing initiative, awarded Passaic County $270,084.00 to support a 
data sharing solution to assist the region.136   
A New Jersey based company, Tetrus, proposed a solution based on a virtual 
platform. The application, Sleuth, was designed on a cloud concept using social 
networking technologies to provide law enforcement users with the ability to share “real-
time” criminal statistics and other crime related information across geographical 
boundaries. The Sleuth suite of applications included: message board technology; an 
intelligent suggestion system to analyze subscriber messages or posts; a dashboard that 
displays the most current messages; and an easy to use mapping system.137 
In the early months of 2012, a series of meetings began to take place with 
agencies specific to the Passaic River Corridor to develop operational strategies, 
supported with criminal intelligence, provided by analysts from the ROIC. The 
operations associated with this initiative included more robust intelligence, information 
sharing, coordination, and planning, than previous initiatives. 
On February 21, 2012, members of the NJ Attorney General’s Office, along with 
high-ranking members of the NJSP, took part in a briefing that defined the multi-agency 
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support operations of the Route (Rt.) 21 Corridor Violent Crime Suppression 
Initiative.138  It was determined that those municipalities along the Rt. 21 Corridor with 
the highest crime rates be included in the initiative. The goal of the operation was to 
deploy limited police resources through a collected and controlled tactical plan to 
“surgically” target violent crime areas or targets based on shared intelligence. Leveraging 
the New Jersey ROIC for its analytical capabilities, law enforcement agencies provided 
crime data and in return received intelligence products related to criminal activity. The 
focus of the analytics for the ROIC analysts focused primarily on violent crime.   
In order to understand and interpret the criminal environment, the ROIC 
developed an Intelligence Collection Cell (ICC).139  The aim was to gather information 
necessary to identify violent offenders and their associates, geographical areas controlled 
by organized groups or gangs, locations that support violent crime, suppliers of drugs or 
weapons, identity of recidivist violent offenders, and the identification of patterns or 
trends related to criminal activity.140  The operations required to collect data included: 
collaboration with local and county law enforcement agencies, the deployment of mobile 
automated license plate readers, surveillance operations, interviews and debriefs of 
arrested individuals, and the coordination with investigators on active criminal cases. To 
ensure intelligence collection objectives were met, an intelligence liaison from each 
participating agency was identified, trained, and provided the appropriate capabilities to 
connect with the ROIC ICC. 
In describing the operational environment, three conceptual areas were identified 
that demonstrated how strategies and tactics would drive operations and that were based 
on the conditions of the criminal environment. Figure 1 illustrates that conceptual 
model.141 
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Figure 1.  3-i Model  142 
In March of 2012, the NJ ROIC developed a unified collection plan to provide a 
strategic framework, which was needed to align intelligence and operational personnel 
under a common goal that would support the Route 21 Corridor initiative.143  The plan 
was for law enforcement agencies to develop intelligence that would drive operational 
objectives focused on violent crime. Using data from the Unified Crime Report (UCR) 
and the NJ POP helped to shape the scope of the plan. The major components of the plan 
included the following: enforcement aim objectives, investigative aim objectives, 
intelligence collection plan, and the intelligence collection cell. 
The premise of each objective was as follows: the enforcement aim and objectives 
focused on target areas prone to violent criminal activity. This objective was realized 
through the use of high visibility patrols, surge deployments in high crime areas, and the 
exchange of information and intelligence that supports investigative activity. 
Investigative aim objectives focused on the identity and investigation of serial offenders 
and associates of violent crime. This objective was realized by identifying offenders and 
their criminal associates, the establishment of serial offender’s modus operandi, the 
seizure of assets of crime to prevent further criminality, and the collection of evidence to 
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support the prosecution of offenders. The intelligence collection plan objective was to 
identify offenders, areas of criminal activity, crime trends, tactics and procedures that 
support violent crime, suppliers of drugs and weapons, funding streams assisting criminal 
activity, and the indication of criminal conspiracies among offenders. In order to meet 
these objectives, the plan required the use of an intelligence collection cell.  
The intelligence cell included a compliment of personnel from the Paterson Police 
Department, Essex County Prosecutor’s Office, and the NJ ROIC. To accomplish their 
mission, intelligence was collected through the use of technology, including the use of 
automated license plate readers (ALPR), ballistics evidence from crime scenes and 
confiscated weapons, narcotic stamps, arrest data debriefing forms from arrested 
individuals, and the exchange of information related to cases in the region. From the data 
and crime related information, intelligence products were produced. 
Preliminary intelligence was provided to NJ State Police Commanders and 
Paterson Police Department officials. Based on the analysis, it was recommended that 
initial operations engage a four-block area, focus on violent crime, and quality of life 
operations.144  
In May of 2012, the NJ ROIC Intelligence and Analysis Unit started the process 
of establishing fusion liaison officers for each of the 17 municipalities in the Route 21 
Corridor region. Individuals were identified as fusion liaison officers to the NJ ROIC for 
each agency. Liaison officers were responsible for the dissemination of information and 
intelligence as well as serving as the point of contact for police executives on intelligence 
and information matters. Meetings between the liaison officers and police executives 
helped to establish a common operating picture of each agencies criminal environment, 
while also providing an opportunity for police executives to define their intelligence 
needs to support the Route 21 Corridor Initiative. With the intelligence collection cell and 
fusion center liaison officers in place, the NJ ROIC Intelligence and Analysis Unit 
created analytics to support law enforcement objectives.  
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Initial operations were conducted at various times over a 28-day cycle. During the 
first 28 days, the focus or area of operation was in the city of Paterson. The Paterson 
Police Department conducted regular patrols and crime fighting programs using the 
analysis provided by the NJ ROIC. On June 21, 2012, law enforcement executives from 
the Route 21 Corridor gathered for their first Corr-Stat Meeting. The meeting established 
a collaborative mechanism for evaluating the impact of intelligence, investigative, and 
enforcement activities had on the region. The meeting included a total of 59 stakeholders, 
representing 26 federal, state, county, and local law enforcement agencies. Leaders 
discussed the current intelligence picture and anti-crime strategies in Paterson and 
Newark cities. Emerging crime issues were also addressed and solutions presented to 
address them. 
Staff from the NJ ROIC provided a description of the most current intelligence 
picture. The analysis was geared toward violent crime, burglary and robbery patterns, 
heroin and firearms recovery, trafficking patterns, and violent recidivist offenders. It was 
stressed that continued analysis required sustained participation and support from all 
agencies in the Route 21 Corridor region. The keystone ingredients in the crime 
suppression initiative were identified as agency collaboration and information sharing. To 
ensure continued support, fusion liaison officers (FLOs) assigned to each agency were 
asked sustain the collection of data and intelligence. 
One of the successful operational tactics used to support the initiative was the 
mobile deployment initiative in Paterson and Newark cities. The initiative included a 
collection of law enforcement agencies that acted as force multipliers through saturation 
details. Their focus was on pre-determined areas within a community based on threat 
assessment and trend analysis, which was provided through intelligence reports.   It was 
noted that the cooperation and collaboration between agencies resulted in over 225 
arrests, including the seizure of 45 firearms in a one-month period.145  Other tactics, 
including prisoner debriefings, provided valuable information that led to the 
identification of criminal activity, criminal suspects, and the associates of criminal types. 
                                                 
145 New Jersey State Police, “Operation Fourth Down.” 
 59 
The final agenda item included discussion regarding items of mutual interest. 
Leaders discussed various crime trends and issues that impacted the region. Specifically, 
they addressed burglaries and potential efforts to solve and prevent them. Also used in 
the initiative were investigative techniques, including identifying persons of interest, their 
associates, and the use of ALPR technology to track criminal suspects and their routes of 
travel. Other recommendations included: the creation of a data-base for pawn shops; the 
collection of residential, automobile, and commercial burglary information; the creation 
of a standard arrest debriefing report; analysis of cargo theft in the region; and a process 
for reporting alerts, warnings, and BOLOs to agencies within the region. 
The efforts associated with the Route 21 Corridor crime suppression initiative 
have slowly developed into a strategy to leverage the collection, analysis, and distribution 
of intelligence products that support law enforcement leaders in their role to reduce 
crime.  
With the description provided of each of the case studies in this chapter, Chapter 
V focuses on the analysis of each case through the “lens” or framework developed from 
the literature review and then thoroughly described in the Research Design and Analysis 








The analysis in this chapter uses the hierarchical and ecosystem framework 
developed through the literature review, which was then presented in Chapter II. The 
framework used to analyze the cases through the hierarchical lens examine characteristics 
including organizational structures and their subsystems, command and control 
authorities, planning, information flows, organizational culture and behavior, SOPs, 
policy, and governance. The frameworks used to examine the cases through the 
ecosystem lens include strategic planning, cooperation, collaboration, interdependencies, 
information flows, diversity, emergence, and networks. Through both lenses, the analysis 
examines the relationship and impact framework characteristics have on agency decision 
makers.   
B. NATIONAL SOCIALIST MOVEMENT RALLY 
1. Hierarchical Analysis 
In Dante Martinelli’s research, Systems Hierarchies and Management, he 
describes through levels of classification the varying system complexities that exist 
within an organization146. The understanding that organizations consist of 
interconnecting hierarchically arranged decision-making units provides a foundation for 
defining the organizations level of complexity and therefore the manager or decision 
makers expected reaction to stimuli presented to him or her.147   
In examining the NSM case study, the analysis starts with a description of the 
organizational structure of hierarchical government agencies involved with the NSM 
rally. In the NSM case, participating organizations, operated under organizational 
structures with varying layers of specialization and command. Under this construct, the 
effects of individuals and their specialized units are controlled so that they can achieve 
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the goals of the organization.148 The model not only includes layers of bureaucracy but 
also subdivided levels of specialization. Most of the specialized functions were situated 
under divisions or branches.  
As author Graham Allison noted in his book, Essence of Decision: The Cuban 
Missile Crisis, government behavior consists less of deliberate choices and more as 
outputs, which are congruent with standard behavior.149  Therefore, the decisions made in 
the initial planning for the NSM rally were predictable, as leaders used specific pre-
determined methods and resources to initiate action.   
In planning for the NSM, the lead agency, the NJSP, used the hierarchical 
incident command model for command and control and all other operational aspects of 
the event. The incident command system provided a temporary organizational structure 
that was similar to the structure of most law enforcement entities in that it was 
hierarchical and subdivided into specialized units. This structure included layers of 
bureaucracy, specialized functions, and a top-down system where command initiated 
guidance and control over operations. Where multiple agencies contributed to the event, 
the NJSP assumed command. The ICS structure and guiding principles were used for the 
event. In a quasi-military setting, similar to a law enforcement agency, the structure 
provides leaders with clarity as to who is doing what work and for what specific purpose. 
The structure provides a high degree of control by providing personnel with specific roles 
and objectives that focus on commander’s intent. 
With more than 500 state troopers and many other law enforcement personnel in 
support of the event, the ICS provided leaders with command and control necessary to 
ensure incident action objectives were met. Layers of bureaucracy created supervisory to 
subordinate ratios according to ICS standards further ensuring strict accountability.  
Academics who have studied organizations have demonstrated that the behavior 
of many individuals is influenced by the controlling purposes of the organizations to 
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which they belong.150 Government agencies are not driven by a bottom line the same way 
business is in the private sector; however, customers (citizens) demand that agencies 
operate efficiently and with clear objectives and under strict direction from management. 
Therefore, law enforcement agencies develop and look for the ideal solutions to ensure 
their decisions meet public expectations. The ICS structure provided such efficiencies. 
The planning design focus was well understood, roles and responsibilities well defined, 
and operations controlled in strict adherence with written policy. 
Control and efficiencies are also created by SOPs and agency strategies. The 
specialized functions of individualized units create mission specific capabilities with 
narrowly focused responsibilities. Under this construct, patrol, investigations, and 
administrative functions or operations are separate from one another. The silos created 
allow command to quickly identify and allocate resources in a way not practical under a 
linear agency model. In the NSM case study, specific specialized units were easily 
plugged into various roles in the ICS table of organization.   
The organized structure of the event made it possible to create and ensure 
communications followed prescribed plans. During the event, radio and written plans 
were shared following regular SOPs and situational awareness protocols.   
The analysis also examined how organizational culture influenced the outcome of 
the NSM event. As described by Graham Allison, “organizations create purposes and 
routines that arise from within, and that are tied to what James March has called ‘the 
concept of identity’, where the identity is a conception of self-organized rules for 
matching actions to situations.”151  Through these rules organizational culture is defined. 
It is further suggested that this approach to understanding organizational behavior sees 
organizations as more autonomous, which allows them to define and respond to tasks in a 
manner that conforms to the organizations capabilities.152 
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In the NSM event, the culture of the law enforcement entity in charge, the NJSP, 
contributed to the overall success of the event. The adherence to standard operating 
procedures, reliance on discipline, command and control, obedience to prescribed rules 
and regulations, and uniformity are recognized as part of the culture and ultimate 
successful outcome in preserving public safety during the event.  
The hierarchical analysis of the NSM event demonstrates the advantage of the top 
down, command and control structure of the ICS. During the course of the event, 
leadership, shaped through organizational culture, used specialized units to their 
advantage in supporting specific roles and assuming certain responsibilities (e.g., 
specialized units for crowd control and air support. In the next section, the NSM will 
once again be analyzed through the ecosystem lens. 
2. Ecosystem Analysis 
Accomplishments of the natural world are often the products of the collective 
interactions of many connected players, where networks, energy flows, 
interdependencies, and interconnectedness create a balance in natural ecosystems.153 In 
this section, the NSM event is analyzed through the ecosystem lens developed through 
this research using the framework that includes, strategic planning, collaboration, 
interdependencies, information flows, diversity emergence, and networks.  
As the NJSP Office of State Governmental Security began to plan for this event, it 
identified the need to include multiple agencies at the federal, state, and local levels to 
support its efforts. Collaboration took place between other NJSP agencies including Field 
Operations, Special Operations, Emergency Management, Office of Attorney General 
and the NJ ROIC. Collaboration also included the FBI, and the U.S. Department of 
Justice, along with the Department of Corrections, Mercer County Sheriff’s Office, 
Trenton Police Department, Trenton Fire Department, the American Red Cross, and 
Salvation Army.  
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Where the emergence of new ideas is usually not considered a process that can be 
planned, collaboration and planning initiatives between specialized subsets of 
organizations and other supporting agencies can sometimes result in novel ideas. In 
preparation for the NSM, the agencies and subsets of those agencies that gathered to 
write the operations plan to support the event generated event-planning ideas through the 
diverse make-up and expertise of those involved.  
With the authorization of HSPD-5 and development of the NIMS, subsequent 
principles were developed to enable effective, efficient, collaboration through the ICS. 
The use of the ICS, as analyzed through the ecosystem lens demonstrates its effectiveness 
by interconnecting and creating collaborative efforts between multiple agencies. During 
the NSM, a unified command was established using two NJSP commanding officers. 
Diversity was also created by incorporating those agencies responsible for certain 
responsibilities required for a model ICS plan (e.g., logistics, finance, communications, 
and a public information officer).   
The leadership responsible for the NSM plans also leveraged the capabilities of 
the NJ ROIC. The NJ ROIC was asked to develop analysis products on the NSM that 
would assist in writing the operations plans. A thorough analysis of the group, their 
background (ideology), tactics, and potential threat to public safety was developed as 
requested. The NJ ROIC also acted as the conduit for information sharing during the 
course of the event, sending regular situational awareness reports to law enforcement and 
other supporting agencies.    
Through the ecosystem lens, the analysis identified how collaboration, diversity, 
and interdependencies between agencies attributed to the planning and operations of the 
event. It further demonstrated how group diversity could lead to the emergence of ideas. 
Flows of information were described through written plans and information provided 
through the NJ ROIC. In the next section, analysis of the Route 21 Corridor initiative is 
conducted using both the hierarchical and ecosystem lenses.   
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C. ROUTE 21 CORRIDOR REGIONAL CRIME SUPPRESSION 
INITIATIVE 
1. Hierarchical Analysis 
The hierarchical analysis of the Route 21 Corridor initiative starts with a 
description of key agencies and their organizational structure. Examination of the 
Paterson Police Department table of organization depicts the agency as having a typical 
hierarchy, similar to that of other government led law enforcement agencies. The 
Paterson Police Department consists of approximately 600 members who are led by a 
police director and chief of police. Under the commander’s control are four sections, each 
with defined roles and responsibilities. Similarly, the New Jersey Division of State Police 
has a comparable but much larger structure as it employs more than 3,500 enlisted and 
civilian members. The model not only includes layers of bureaucracy but also subdivided 
levels of specialization. Most of the specialized functions are situated under divisions or 
branches. The model of each law enforcement entity is designed in a typical top down 
command and control bureaucracy.    
The structure of law enforcement agencies creates a high level of control and 
authority for leaders. The design further creates efficiencies by allowing for the command 
and control over large numbers of people assigned to complete various tasks. Therefore, 
it comes as no surprise that the Corr-Stat meetings, planning objectives, and operational 
decisions are made exclusively by executive leaders from each of the participating 
agencies. As demonstrated in the Route 21 Corridor initiative, executive leaders drive the 
objectives and missions associated with the event.   
The analysis demonstrated that leaders at the all levels of government often make 
decisions and drive operations for smaller bureaucracies to provide solutions to problems. 
In Paterson, New Jersey, a rise in violent crime and shootings was in part attributed to a 
lack of police enforcement, which resulted from the layoffs of 125 police officers. The 
combination of layoffs with increased crime attracted media attention to the city of 
Paterson and the surrounding region. Consistent with the behavior of the hierarchical 
model, a top-down approach to addressing a noted increase in crime was initiated. 
Leadership from the NJSP, with encouragement from NJ’s Attorney General’s Office, 
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met with law enforcement officials to address and develop a crime fighting strategy. It 
was those officials who determined the role law enforcement would embrace and 
operations that would focus on violent crime. 
As previously described, a characteristic of the hierarchical organization includes 
a top-down approach to problem solving, providing leaders the luxury of “fitting” 
capabilities together to create strategies. This approach can result in developing less than 
complex solutions to address complex situations by focusing on efficiencies and creating 
strategies based on the capabilities of agency specific resources limiting the leaders’ 
creativity. The analysis revealed that this was the case in New Jersey, as demonstrated 
through Governor Corzine’s Strategy for Safe Streets and Neighborhoods.154 
The strategy called for the development of a prevention policy board, violent 
crime coordinator, reentry coordinating council, and a governor’s oversight committee. 
Each of these functions was created at the state level where it added additional layers of 
bureaucracy within state government. The structure created authorities through a 
hierarchical command and control system that put state agency leaders in decision-
making positions to ensure objectives were met in the most efficient manner.  
As agencies adopted the strategy, they assessed their capabilities to determine if 
they could meet plan objectives. Following the hierarchical model, the crime strategy 
evolved into law enforcement and non-law enforcement centric missions working 
independently of one another.   
The goals and objectives of the Strategy for Safe Streets and Neighborhoods155 
strategy follow both the hierarchical model of strategic planning outlined by Mintzberg et 
al., and Graham Allison’s analysis of organizational behavior.156  In his research, 
Graham Allison describes how fixed standards, operating procedures, and capabilities 
frame organizations;157 we see how the decision-making process of leaders is influenced. 
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The behavior of the organization can be explained in terms of organizational purposes 
and practices common to the members of the organization. The leaders of the 
organizations focus on their agency capabilities to solve problems, which forces the 
organization into a preset solution to problem solving. This model follows what 
Mintzberg et al., would refer to as decomposition, where strategies are broken down into 
sub strategies for successful implementation.158  This process gives rise to a whole set of 
hierarchies, each with its own time perspectives: short, medium, and long term.159  
Analysis of the Route 21 Corridor initiative demonstrates this philosophy. As agencies 
were pulled into the strategy, they focused on their capabilities to solve problems while 
also creating objectives or other strategies within their own departments.  
The Route 21 Corridor case study also demonstrates how culture can drive 
organization behavior. The leaders of the law enforcement agencies involved in the crime 
suppression initiative focused their efforts and attention to law enforcement activities. 
This would appear to be a logical approach since each agency followed specific standard 
operating procedures that guided its mission and directed the choices leaders made in 
executing strategies. The actions of the varying agencies represented in these cases led to 
the conclusion that the outcome of the hierarchal model and agency culture tends to lead 
organizations and their leaders to focus on internal integration, where members develop a 
collective identity and learn to work together with efficiency. The culture can be further 
described as a bureaucratic culture, which has an internal focus and consistency160 
orientation for a stable environment. This culture, described by Richard Daft, supports a 
methodical approach to doing business; its success is in its efficient design161.  
Through the hierarchical analysis of the Route 21 Corridor initiative, several 
characteristics associated with hierarchical organizations and their influence on decision 
makers were identified. The case started with an analysis of the Strategy for Safe Streets 
and Neighborhoods, identifying the hierarchical role and top down, command and control 
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culture of government agencies.162  The strategy empowered state agency leaders to 
oversee committees, which, in turn, developed problem-solving objectives. Similar 
observations were also noted in the roles of executive leaders who participated in the 
Route 21 Corridor initiative, most of whom were law enforcement executives. The 
initiative demonstrated how government agencies and their leaders often limit their focus 
on problem solving using only those capabilities most familiar and available to them. 
Finally, the analysis looks at how organizational logic and culture influences decision 
makers. As described by Graham Allison, “Organizations create purposes and routines 
that arise from within, and that are tied to the concept of identity, where the identity is a 
conception of self-organized rules for matching actions to situations.”163   
2. Ecosystem Analysis 
New Jersey Governor Jon Corzine developed and delivered his Strategy for Safe 
Streets and Neighborhoods in the fall of 2007.164  The impetus behind the strategy was 
an increase in murder and weapons possession cases. The strategy focused on, violent 
crime enforcement, prevention, and reentry. The plan called for the development of a 
Prevention Policy Board for each community that would include members from state, 
local, and the private sector to assist in developing policy to ensure cities could “connect 
the dots” in terms of understanding the entire picture of risk and protective factors to 
address crime-related issues.165 Implementation of the strategy resulted in the creation of 
a Prevention Policy Board and Municipal Advisory Board and Municipal Advisory 
Council for each of six urban areas initially targeted for implementation. Their primary 
focus was to serve the role of designated youth planners for each city. The plan was 
written with the concept of creating collaboration and including feedback from 
constituents. The creation of the boards would also permit the development of networks 
and connectedness between agencies. 
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The first goal, enforcement, focused on law enforcement capabilities including an 
assessment to develop new technology that would assist with crime fighting initiatives 
and an assessment of gang related crime that recommended that law enforcement 
coordinate criminal investigations through an assigned violent crime coordinator from the 
NJ Attorney General’s Office. The plan also identified the ROIC as the collection point 
for gang related information and analysis of crimes involving the use of a firearm. 
Finally, listed as action item under this goal was the acknowledgement and requirement 
of community involvement, suggesting that active participation of the community in 
identifying neighborhood concerns will lead to enhanced communication, which could 
prevent crime.166   
The second goal, prevention described those efforts that would prevent crime. The 
strategy describes the state’s dedication of 35.6 million dollars towards collaborative 
coordinated funding and implementation of preventative programs.167  The action items 
under this goal also identify a prevention coordinator (appointed by the Attorney 
General) and a prevention-funding guide. 
The third goal, reentry focused on recidivism reduction. The actions related to this 
goal supported the creation of a reentry coordinating council, a reentry “demonstration 
project,” increased support for youth returning from juvenile justice institutions, and the 
relief of impediments for persons who establish rehabilitation.168 
Finally, the responsibility of oversight and accountability was assigned to a newly 
created accountability structure led by the Governor’s Oversight Committee for Safe 
Streets and Neighborhoods.169  The structure of the committee included state agency 
executive leaders, four members from the public sector, and co-chairs of the Statewide 
Association of the County Youth Service Commission. An additional layer of 
coordinating councils was established to ensure collaboration and coordination existed  
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between agencies and that goals would be met. The three councils, law enforcement, 
prevention, and reentry, were tasked with oversight of implementation and evaluation of 
strategic goals. 
The strategy described how 35.6 million dollars was allocated to 10 state agencies 
towards the collaborative, coordinated, and implementation of prevention programs.170 
The 10 agencies included the Department of Child and Families; Department of Human 
Services; Department of Health and Senior Services; Department of Transportation; 
Department of Community Affairs; Department of Agriculture; Department of 
Environmental Protection; Department of Corrections; Department of Military and 
Veterans Affairs; Department of Education, New Jersey State Police; Motor Vehicle 
Commission; and the Governor’s Council on Drugs and Alcohol. The plan demonstrates 
how collaboration, diversity, and interdependencies can be developed between 
government agencies through strategic planning. 
The Strategy for Safe Streets and Neighborhoods incorporated several of the 
characteristics identified in the ecosystem framework.171  The plan called for an 
assessment of current technologies that could potentially be enhanced to support 
information sharing and feedback loops that in turn would enhance collaboration and 
ultimately lead to success in crime fighting and prevention programs. The plan also 
created a violent crime and crime prevention coordinator who could develop increased 
levels of connectivity between participating agencies by identifying and exploiting 
interdependencies. By establishing an oversight committee, the plan created possibilities 
for network opportunities between agency leaders and the public. Furthermore, the 
diversity of participating agencies identified in the plan allowed for opportunities to 
create and solve problems with novel ideas.  
The release of the strategic plan led other government agencies at the county level 
to use the plan as an opportunity to develop county level crime strategy plans. County 
prosecutors and law enforcement entities developed individual plans and subsequently 
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initiated county operations. The Morris County Prosecutors Office, in turn, developed 
and posted on their website a strategy outlining its adoption of the state strategy.  
Although there was no identified objective in the Safe Streets and Neighborhood 
strategy to initiate the Route 21 Corridor initiative there is some connection to that the 
initiative, which emerged more than two years after the release of the strategy did have 
some connectivity to the strategy. 
The strategy of the Route 21 Corridor can best be described as a joint effort of 
local, state, and federal officials who have collaborated on crime fighting strategies. The 
developments in the Route 21 Corridor were attributed to an increase of crime during the 
year 2008, which led to the development of a strategy through the collaborative efforts of 
what became the “Corr-Stat,” which is a meeting opportunity where local, county, state, 
and federal partners shared information and strategies for crime fighting. The 
environment included almost 20 municipalities. Discussions led to learning, which 
subsequently lent itself to the establishment of a strategy that created an information 
sharing environment in that region, one that led to the analysis of crime and criminals that 
supported law enforcement activities. The strategy, not formally written, emerged 
through the collaborative efforts of law enforcement officials. The emergence of this 
strategy came as a result of meetings where the sharing of information, crime data, and 
lessons learned through enforcement efforts made up the agenda. As the initiative grew, 
leaders recognized the need for a more robust information-sharing environment.   
Funding through a federal grant was identified to support and bring the concept of 
an information-sharing environment to fruition. The grant supported the design and 
implementation of a software solution where law enforcement would be able to share 
“real-time” crime data and other law enforcement information seamlessly across 
jurisdictions.   
The ecosystem analysis of the Route 21 Corridor crime suppression initiative 
identified all of the characteristics of the ecosystem framework. Examples of planning, 
collaboration, interdependencies, information flow, diversity, emergence, and networks 
were present; some exhibited greater influence on organizations and their decision 
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makers then others. The state’s strategic plan included objectives that would initiate 
collaboration between local, county, and state agencies, which, in turn, would create 
interdependencies. Identifying the NJ ROIC as the central point for information 
collection, analysis, and sharing also created information flows. Finally, diversity was 
established by creating committees that included public and private officials from various 
levels of government with various levels of expertise. 
In the following chapter, Chapter VI, the findings of this research are presented 
along with the application of both hierarchical and ecosystem characteristics presented 
through a model where the coalescence of both models are presented through an actual 
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VI. FINDINGS, APPLICATION, RECOMMENDATIONS, AND 
CONCLUSION 
A. FINDINGS 
The research was conducted with the premise that prevention strategies for 
complex manmade threats to our nation require collaboration and knowledge sharing 
among government agencies in order to enhance prevention, preparedness, response, and 
recovery efforts; a dictum that resulted in the creation of the “homeland security” 
environment. This environment includes many individual hierarchal agencies, where 
leaders perform in a non-linear manner as they attempt to connect, share information, and 
collaborate in a rugged environment that calls for characteristics closely mirroring those 
of a complex adaptive system.   
This research therefore asked, “What can be learned through a comparative 
analysis of the New Jersey homeland security environment through both a hierarchical 
and ecosystem lens and what influence do those models have on decision makers?”  
Through the analysis the research also set out to answer the following second tier of 
questions: 
1. What are the prominent links that connect government agency leaders 
within the New Jersey State homeland security environment? 
2. What element, processes, laws, and or strategies, direct decision makers in 
their homeland security mission? 
3. How does an ecosystem perspective inform the design of future fusion 
center knowledge sharing and collaboration initiatives within the New Jersey state 
homeland security environment? 
The analysis was conducted by first creating two sets of frameworks or lenses 
from the literature review. Case studies, which represented examples of complex events 
that fell within the parameter of New Jersey’s homeland security environment, were 
described and then analyzed through those lenses.   
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The analysis of the case studies through the hierarchical lens demonstrated how 
command and control, efficiencies, specialization, SOPs, and organizational culture can 
impact decision makers and lead to the successful planning and operations associated 
with a pre-planned event. The NSM event was planned using the advantages of the 
hierarchical organizational characteristics which ensured clarity in direction, command, 
and control. The many layers of bureaucracy, specialization, and management allowed 
commanding officers to easily assign roles and responsibilities to line officers and 
identify those with special roles (canine, swat, etc.) to fulfill mission specific 
assignments.   
In both cases, it was apparent that organizations demonstrate behavior where 
individuals are influenced by the controlling purposes of the organization to which they 
belong.172  In the NSM and the Route 21 Corridor initiative, government agencies relied 
on agency culture, SOPs, and internal resources to create efficiencies.   
Strategic planning was also identified as a critical piece within the analysis. In the 
NSM, event planning followed the ICS proving the model provided appropriate levels of 
command, control, and management. The planning model used by the Corzine 
administration for the Safe Streets and Neighborhoods strategic plan followed the 
traditional planning school model where the mission, vision, goals, and objectives were 
developed and controlled by executive leaders at the highest levels of government. Where 
the plan called for collaboration, interdependencies, and a whole of community approach 
to address issues at the local level, little documentation was available to demonstrate how 
the plan was implemented at the local level. 
The framework for the ecosystem lens included strategic planning, collaboration, 
interdependencies, information flows, diversity, emergence, and networks. The analysis 
discovered that collaborative properties existed throughout both cases. As one might 
expect, large complex events require the input, cooperation, and resources of various 
agencies. The planning model of the ICS, and the Safe Streets and Neighborhoods plan 
both resulted in agency collaboration and information sharing.  
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Information sharing was also a critical characteristic in both cases. The NJ ROIC 
was identified in both cases, as the focal point for information collection, analysis, and 
sharing. The recognition of the NJ ROIC as the primary point of information sharing in 
New Jersey allowed leaders of the Route 21 Corridor initiative to accomplish intelligence 
led policing objectives that would not have been possible otherwise.  
The analysis demonstrated how plans could easily create diversity in the 
ecosystem environment by bringing agencies together that would not normally be 
considered as having a role in a homeland security initiative. The NJ ROIC, as described 
in the New Jersey homeland security environment, incorporates local, state, and federal 
partners in its day-to-day operations, which creates connectedness and collaboration. This 
dynamic allows for the introduction of varying opinions when addressing complex issues. 
The findings from the research and analysis exposed some of the many 
characteristics of the hierarchical and ecosystem analysis, and how those characteristics 
can influence agencies and their leaders. In the following section, the lessons learned 
from this research are outlined through the experience of an actual event that created 
opportunities for the NJ ROIC to integrate both ecosystem and hierarchal model 
characteristics to meet the demands of their customers.   
B. APPLICATION 
On October 26, 2012 the NJ ROIC elevated its operational status to a level two in 
preparation for tropical cyclone, “Hurricane Sandy,” which at that time was bearing down 
on New Jersey’s coastline. By October 29, 2012, the state’s governor, Chris Christie had 
declared a state of emergency, and by 8:00 p.m., Hurricane Sandy made land fall in the 
general area of Atlantic City. This, the most severe storm to ever impact the state, passed 
through the region leaving a devastating trail of ruin to the environment, entire 
communities, and much of the state’s public and private infrastructure. In the aftermath, 
the NJ ROIC would not only continue its role in support of local, state, and federal 
government agencies but would also embrace new challenges in support of the response 
and recovery missions that followed.  
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The models described in the research include frameworks that incorporate 
strategic planning, cooperation, collaboration, interdependencies; information flows, 
diversity, emergence, command and control, SOPs, and networks. Although the NJ ROIC 
organizationally fits into a hierarchy within state government, it offers the greatest 
capacity to adapt, share information and knowledge, offer opportunity for collaboration, 
embrace diversity, and foster emerging trends and solutions to complex problems. The 
environment of a fusion center is prime for the application of both models described 
throughout this body of work. What follows in this section will be participant 
observations of the five mission objectives that emerged at the NJ ROIC during the 
disaster management phases of Hurricane Sandy. These five mission objectives not only 
underscore the value of coalescing the two disparate models, but they provide a future 
roadmap for homeland security development. 
1. Enhanced Information Sharing—Dissemination of Disaster 
Information 
According to disaster emergency operations plans, government agencies at all 
levels have a prescript plan they are expected to activate in order to coordinate response 
and recovery efforts during and in the aftermath of a disaster. The NJ ROIC’s primary 
mission under those conditions is to act as the information sharing point for the state. 
Primarily, the role is to disseminate situation, weather, and traffic reports to its broad 
spectrum of customers. Following the SOPs and policies, which are characteristic of the 
hierarchical model, the NJ ROIC accomplished this task; however, the complexity and 
magnitude of the event placed an even greater demand for information sharing, leading 
the NJ ROIC to assume non-traditional roles in support of the event. With local and 
county offices of emergency management overwhelmed with requests for resources in 
response to the disaster, leaders were unable to provide a complete description of their 
operating environment. Through the NJ ROIC’s outreach program and partnership with 
the All Hazards Consortium and data provider Hughes Network Systems, the NJ ROIC 
was able to provide the private sector with information on the most current status of fuel, 
food, hotel, and pharmacy locations and levels of operation. Messages were sent daily 
that assisted the private sector by providing this awareness.   
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2. Enhanced Information Sharing—Gathering of Disaster Related 
Information 
Using the established law enforcement network created by the NJ ROIC with the 
Monmouth and Ocean County Prosecutors’ Offices and the chiefs of police (in those 
areas most severely impacted by Hurricane Sandy), the NJ ROIC Fusion Liaison 
Intelligence and Training Unit, along with the Intelligence and Analysis Unit, began the 
process of developing a reporting mechanism that would create an information flow of 
data related to criminal activity in the affected areas. Analysts also produced a collection 
reporting template for the 300 NJ State Troopers and 290 other out of state troopers 
deployed from various parts of the country in support of the safety and security missions 
associated with the disaster. The template was used to capture criminal behavior 
including, arrests, suspicious activity, and signs of crime (e.g., signs of forced entry). 
Later, troopers assigned to the NJ ROIC were detailed to each county to work directly 
with each prosecutor’s office, allowing for an even greater collection of information. 
Each day, prior to the close of business an intelligence product was disseminated to law 
enforcement officials outlining all arrests and criminal trends related to the storm. The 
information provided a balance of factual information for the Attorney General, his staff, 
and the executive leaders in each of the impacted communities. 
3. Production of Disaster Intelligence for Senior Government Executives 
As the NJ ROIC continued to further define its role in support of the disaster, an 
emergence of suspected criminal behavior became a concern of NJ Attorney General 
Jeffrey Chiesa. Anecdotal stories from local politicians and media reports declaring that 
crimes of “looting” (theft) and burglary were rampant in disaster affected areas resulted 
in another requirement of the NJ ROIC. The NJ ROIC was charged with providing 
analysis of this situation—a task never before required of it, as it was being asked to 
verify the reports of crime, when in fact criminal acts, if legitimate would not yet have 
been reported by property owners. Using various sources, analysts confirmed, through 




those communities. To make policy-level decisions, the Attorney General was provided 
intelligence about the fragile and unstable operating environment as it related to law 
enforcement operations and criminal activity. 
4. Production of Disaster Intelligence for Field Personnel 
With the deployment of over 500 law enforcement officers into the impacted 
areas along the coast, the need for updated law enforcement related information, maps, 
and other general public safety messaging was necessary to better inform commanders 
and their subordinates. The NJ ROIC developed an “out of state, state police” distribution 
list, where critical information was e-mailed to constituents on a regular basis. Maps of 
the region were also provided to the entire contingent of law enforcement personnel 
providing before and after depictions of the storms impact, as well as situational 
awareness related to each municipality. 
5. Focused Collection Efforts to Support FEMA and NJ OEM 
Operations 
In response, a plan was developed that created collaboration through a networking 
of local police chiefs and personnel from the NJ ROIC. The network created information 
flows that provided invaluable information used in the protection and rehabilitation of 
those communities most severely impacted by the storm. Through the chiefs of police 
network, NJ ROIC personnel were deployed into the field and began the process of 
collecting information related to the condition of various municipal government buildings 
and infrastructure. The reports were developed for the NJ OEM to share with FEMA and 
the Army Corps of Engineers to further prioritize mission assignments.   
6. Observations  
The events that followed the devastating impact of Hurricane Sandy created a 
chaotic environment; the subsequent multi-disciplinary approach to problem solving 
demonstrated how the NJ ROIC can adapt and embrace the characteristics of the 
ecosystem model, which influenced decision makers. The fusion center model’s 
characteristics, which include, collaboration and cooperation between multiple 
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government and private sector agencies, an emergence of ideas to solve complex 
problems, information flows, leadership principles that create a culture that allows for 
and encourages creativity and planning, helped to foster an environment that allowed for 
the solving of complex issues.   
Where the research set out to analyze the impact the homeland security 
environment has on decision makers through the analysis of two separate lenses, the 
ecosystem and hierarchical lens, attributes from both models proved to be invaluable to 
the success of today’s homeland security environment. What follows in section C are 
recommendations to further embrace the ecosystem characteristics, incorporating them 
into the NJ homeland security enterprise. 
C. RECOMMENDATIONS 
Within the federal government, it was the events of 9/11 and subsequent 
realization that the threats of terrorism from state sponsored and individual terrorist 
organizations, or radical fundamentalists, brought to the forefront a level of complexity 
current government entities were not prepared to address. The need for information 
sharing is one of the most obvious weaknesses addressed in the aftermath of the 9/11 
attacks. The result of this catastrophic event led to a reorganization of federal government 
agencies and the creation of the DHS. Strategies that followed centered on information 
and resource sharing with an emphasis on collaboration. Networking between 
governmental agencies and the privates sector, along with the leveraging of resources 
from partner agencies, is now the expected norm. The demands on leaders to operate in 
this new paradigm creates an inherent impediment in that hierarchical organizational 
models that are believed to have created a culture, where a leaders command and control 
mindset does not always fall in line with the open, networked system envisioned through 
the creation of a homeland security enterprise. 
Understanding the inherent difficulty in a government’s ability to reorganize, the 
recommendations include minor changes to certain processes currently in place at the 
state level. They also describe how strategic planning, technology, and training can 
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influence leaders, while also altering culture, enhancing collaboration, flexibility, and 
connectedness throughout the homeland security enterprise. 
In order to develop a better model to support the New Jersey state homeland 
security mission, the state should consider amending App.A:9–64, the “New Jersey 
Domestic Security Preparedness Act.”  This amendment would dissolve the New Jersey 
Domestic Preparedness Task Force and create the NJ Homeland Security Task Force. 
The newly created NJ Homeland Security Task Force would include the members of the 
previous task force along with other representatives from the federal government who are 
currently members of the NJ ROIC Governance Board. The current Domestic Security 
Planning Group (established through the Domestic Security Preparedness Act) and the NJ 
ROIC Governance Board would both fall under the Homeland Security Task Force as the 
fusion center and preparedness collaborative advisory committees. NJ’s fusion center 
governance board structure and by laws, which currently relegate authority to the 
Director of the OHSP as the chief executive and decision maker, would not apply to 
either of the advisory committees. Both committees would allow leaders a more active 
role in decision-making and strategic planning. Once established, both advisory 
committees would focus on developing and contributing to a statewide information-
sharing environment to enhance homeland security collaboration. 
The research also recognized the need for organizational change, understanding 
that many agencies including “state police organizations are well known for custom and 
tradition—meaning change is painful and slow. As a result, reform efforts are more 
dependent on cultural aspects that yield change than creative ideas that win support from 
change advocates.”173 To change organizational culture that will impact the decision-
making process for leaders the use of scenarios and a blend of strategic planning methods 
are suggested.  
As noted throughout the research most of today’s government agencies and 
organizations structure follow a hierarchical model. This research provides some 
recommendations to enhance collaboration, while broadening leaders’ decision-making 
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capacity by introducing knowledge and information. These suggested changes would not 
necessitate the need for drastic change to the existing hierarchies within. To understand 
complex issues, decision makers will have to collaborate with the “whole” homeland 
security enterprise. As depicted in the research, it is suggested that governance boards 
with hierarchical structure, by-laws and top-down management, should consider the 
establishment of collaborative advisory committees in lieu of the formal governance 
board structure. This would allow leaders to present and develop solutions to solve issues 
relevant to them and the overarching homeland security program through an open 
networked solution. The use of collaborative advisory boards gives representatives more 
access and control to other board members without forcing agencies to enter into 
memorandums of understanding, which can be an obstacle in establishing working 
relationships between government entities.    
Finally, key to the success and advancement in learning, sharing knowledge, and 
collaboration is in the development and participation of a robust information-sharing 
environment. Cultural changes that lead to leaders’ acceptance and participation in this 
endeavor will be key to its success. As leaders begin to share information with other 
government agencies, the private and public sector, they will gain knowledge through 
feedback loops, broadening their understanding and awareness of complex problems, 
therefore allowing them the decision making skills needed in the homeland security 
environment.   
Currently, the Route 21 Corridor initiative is working towards the creation of a 
cross-jurisdictional information-sharing environment to assist law enforcement agencies 
in that region, while also establishing connectivity to the NJ ROIC for further support for 
analytics and information sharing capabilities. This virtual tool is meant to leverage cloud 
computing and social networking technologies that will provide law enforcement with 
better opportunities to share information in that region. This project initiative is meant to 
break down cultural barriers that currently exist due to the many disparate technologies in 
existence today that inhibit agencies from having a true, real time information sharing 
environment for crime fighting professionals. The information-sharing environment will 
also broaden agency leaders’ perspectives on crime trends and criminal related concerns 
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of neighboring or other cross-jurisdictional partners. Where this cloud based initiative 
provides the first step in generating interconnectedness between law enforcement 
agencies, the next step should expand on the ability to include a more complex solution 
that could integrate other non-law enforcement agencies and the public to access this 
virtual environment. As the environment grows and includes additional users, their ability 
to post and share information will assist agencies in solving crime, better understanding 
the concerns of the public, and developing or enhancing relationships. 
Recognizing the need for a statewide information sharing environment platform, 
the state of New Jersey began the early stages of designing a scope of work that will 
define how the state can meet this goal. Based on a technology assessment conducted by 
the Integrated Justice Information System Institute, a recommendation was made that 
outlined a course of action for the state, based on the concept that the NJ ROIC would 
become the focal point for information sharing, which connect state and local entities to 
the federal government. 
The key difference between this design and that of existing platforms is that it will 
be a “smart” platform design that will include automated analytical processes. 
Furthermore, the cloud-based environment will allow users to provide information 
automatically through current systems and pull or analyze data without the assistance of 
fusion center analysts. In this environment, private sector partners could upload 
suspicious activity reports, retail theft, and other crimes or behavior (i.e., purchases of 
large quantities of certain precursor chemicals known for their use in homemade 
explosives). The program design will also allow for the automated collection of ALPR 
information and records management system feeds. To truly allow for a holistic approach 
to public safety and homeland security, this environment will also allow non-law 
enforcement entities to contribute their data and automatically search and create analytics 
from open source, social media sites.   
Where technology will play a significant role in its contribution to the ecosystem 
model, the interaction and needed cultural shift between agency leaders in the homeland 
security profession will take place, in part through strategic planning. Here, both the 
methodology, along with the solutions generated through strategic planning efforts, will 
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change how leaders engage problems, people, and, ultimately, how they are influenced in 
decision-making processes. Strategic planning must incorporate processes that will 
influence leaders to explore solutions to problems that might entail the capabilities and 
resources of other non-similar agencies to leverage their professional expertise and 
perspective. To accomplish this goal, leaders must embrace the concepts of complex 
leadership. 
Complex leadership differs from traditional leadership styles in several ways. 
According to Marion and Uhl-Bien, “complex leadership argues that organizations and 
their leaders are products of interactive dynamics. That is, leaders do not create the 
system but rather are created by it, through emergence.”174 The complex leadership style 
is not top-down driven; rather, it fosters bottom-up behavior, enhancing creativity by 
truly empowering subordinates at the lower levels. A major role of the leader is to foster 
relationships to create interdependencies and connectedness between agents. In turn, 
complexity changes the perspective of the leader and subordinate role, which in turn can 
have an impact on the culture of the organization and how it views its leaders and handles 
problems.   
In order to foster an environment that influences decision making, encourages, 
creative thinking, solving problem, collaboration with partner agencies and the 
community, leaders should focus on the use of contemporary strategic planning 
philosophy. Using a hybrid of styles, leaders should be encouraged to provide 
organizations with a broad vision, using the entrepreneurial school model where the 
central concept is to create a mental representation of strategy by the leaders of the 
organization.175  Leaders then need to step back and allow strategies to emerge 
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to address agency needs and response to agency demands. Strategies should encourage 
this behavior, which will create novel ideas and initiatives to deal with complex 
homeland security issues. 
The analysis, developed from information and data received through a robust 
information sharing environment would drive strategic planning objectives, where the 
overarching mission would be to address public safety issues to enhance the quality of 
life for individuals through the reduction or prevention of crime. Strategic planning 
would allow for flexibility, create learning, encourage change, and by design have 
feedback loops for continued adaptation. The strategic response capability would also 
enable leaders to respond quickly and cost-effectively to challenges and opportunities in 
this complex environment.176  Figure 2 is an illustration of this strategic planning 
process. 
 
Figure 2.  OODA LOOP177  
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One of the challenges for leaders will be to balance between stability and 
flexibility, where the stability of strategic planning and decision processes do not 
overshadow the necessary amount of instability that allows for continuous change and 
adaptation in this complex environment.178   
Leaders should also be encouraged to use scenario based planning whenever 
appropriate. Scenario based planning assists organizations in their development of 
policies to guide the organization. The difficulty in planning is in the realization that 
there is uncertainty and ambiguity in the environment, which creates for an unpredictable 
future.179  According to author Kees Van Der Heijden:  
Strategic planning requires the following six elements: acknowledgement 
of aims, through an external mandate, or the organic purpose of survival; 
assessment of the organization s characteristics, including its capability to 
change; assessment of the environment current and future; assessment of 
the fit between the two; invention and development of policies to improve 
the fit; and decisions and action to implement the strategy.180  
The use of scenario planning is one approach to dealing with all six 
characteristics. According to Godet, “In this process a scenario is the set formed by the 
description of a future situation and the course of events that enables one to progress 
from the original situation to the future situation.”181   
By applying these methodologies to the Safe Streets and Neighborhoods, strategic 
plans would have resulted in initiatives that focused on bottom up strategies rather than 
the top-down hierarchical plans used by the Corzine administration. The objectives and 
local efforts would then be based on community concerns and interdependencies with 
other jurisdictions.   
The inherent value of the ICS model would suggest agencies continue its use for 
events planning. However, leaders should also develop objectives that might expose 
                                                 
178 Bandhold and Lindgren, Scenario Planning, 13. 
179 Michael Godet, “The Art of Scenarios and Strategic Planning: Tools and Pitfalls,” Technical 
Forecasting and Social Change 65 (2000): 15. 
180 Ibid. 
181 Ibid., 11. 
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potential obstacles or threats to public safety. Through collaborative-based strategies, 
participating agency leaders would engage in facilitated conversations in planning for the 
event. A shift from approaching the planning process from an agency role and 
responsibility philosophy to a holistic, network systems mindset would enhance and 
influence the decision-making process for leaders. Using a blend of red-team and 
scenario based strategies, leaders would be exposed to the potential gaps in tactical plans 
while also running through scenarios that provide a narrative that would “shift the 
thinking” so that leaders would see things from a different perspective—challenging 
decision makers to engage the whole environment rather than their role in the 
environment.182 The illustration in Figure 3 is a depiction of the steps that would be 
included in the scenario planning process. 
 
Figure 3.  Scenario Planning Process 
                                                 
182 Louis van der Merwe, “Scenario-Based Strategy in Practice: A Framework,” Advances in 
Developing Human Resources 10, no. 2 (May 2008): 16, doi: 10.1177/1523422307313321. 
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The use of scenario analysis is often used for complex issues where there is an 
uncertainty about the outcome of an event. Scenario analysis brings decision makers 
together and can have a strong impact on decision makers thinking.183  Essential to this 
model is the inclusion of planners, analysts, and decision makers in the scenario planning 
and analysis processes.   
Applying the scenario planning process to the NSM, leaders would have started 
by identifying the issues, which in this case would include all aspects that could have an 
impact on public safety resulting from potential events surrounding or related to the NSM 
event. In the second phase of analysis, the NSM, its history/background, past behavior, 
and other information would be collected, along with information related to the physical 
environment, counter protestors, and the potential risk posed to public safety. This 
information would then be analyzed and used for scenario planning. It is during this 
process that the future originates from the present and takes shape through complex 
interactions between various agents from a multitude of organizations.184   
Applying this methodology to the NSM would have created dialogue between the 
various leaders of many of the organizations that participated in the planning and 
operations for the event. The outcome of the scenarios would have prompted questions 
about NSM activities prior to the event, potentially leading to plans that would have 
included the threat to the NSM members during their visit and pre-rally meeting in 
Pemberton Borough, New Jersey. This hypothesis is derived from the facts learned about 
the actions of the protestors who assaulted the NSM members after the event. An 
investigation discovered that protestors used social media to incite others to “phone-jam” 
the Comfort Inn and 449 Club in Pemberton where the NSM were holding their pre-rally 
meeting. The collaboration of agency leaders and use of scenarios may have led to 
questions about potential outbreaks of violence and means of identifying collection points  
 
 
                                                 
183 Richards Heuer and Randolph Pherson, Structured Analytic Techniques for Intelligence Analysis 
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(social media) for law enforcement leading up to the day of the event. The use of social 
media as a tool for gathering information that would be shared in this environment leads 
to the final recommendation. 
Critical to this model is the information-sharing environment that broadens 
leaders’ decision-making processes. Information sharing is critical to the collaboration 
and decision-making processes used to shape agency strategies. The information-sharing 
environment would allow agencies to use data from sources not currently available to 
potentially connect criminals to associates, evidence to potential criminals, and criminal 
activity to terrorist organizations or threats. The leaders’ role in supporting this 
collaborative environment will need to be one that supports and understands the need to 
engage multiple agencies of all scales, where diversity is common place, individual 
missions vary, and interdependencies and connectedness to other entities is uncommon 
from each individual leaders perspective. The overwhelming impact for leaders in their 
decision-making will come from the information and knowledge they share with partner 
agencies. To that end, leaders will look to solve problems through available options that 
are supported using resources and knowledge from their own or other agencies. Using 
advanced technology, NJ ROIC analysts would pull information from the information-
sharing environment and conduct “predictive” analysis to assist local operations. The 
analysis would focus on cross-jurisdictional associations and other public safety issues 
that contribute to a holistic approach and understanding of the community. Decision 
makers would use this analysis to support initiatives. The use of social media, input from 
the public, and data from local records management systems would create a holistic 
picture—the, who, what, where, when, and why, analysis of the criminal environment.   
The information-sharing environment builds on the current conceptual model 
being considered for development in New Jersey. This model includes a plan to have a 
cross jurisdictional capacity that reaches homeland security agents throughout the state. 
The environment includes a “smart” platform that enables automated analytical 
processes, allowing partner agencies to conduct analysis independently without the use of 
fusion center analysts. The information-sharing environment will not only allow for 
greater analysis and problem solving opportunities but also will change the culture of 
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organizations and broaden the aperture of the lens leaders view their environment 
through. The dynamic created through the information-sharing environment impacts 
leaders understanding of their role, its impact on the community as well as the culture of 
the organization. 
In the complex homeland security environment, technology creates a paradigm 
shift for leaders, requiring them to adjust their roles and perceptions. Agency leaders 
have traditionally focused on their agency specific responsibilities and capabilities when 
engaging public safety or other issues; however, once exposed to the robust information-
sharing environment in the ecosystem model, leaders will leverage lessons learned from 
partner agencies and use collaborative strategies to solve problems. Through this process, 
leaders’ intent, understanding of complex problems, eventual development of policy to 
encourage further collaboration and resource sharing will result in a culture shift. This 
will change organizations and their modus operandi in the way they engage other 
agencies and complex problems. 
D. CONCLUSION 
Organizations in the private sector have used the term ecosystem as a metaphor to 
describe their working environment. The advent of the homeland security has also 
created a similar phenomenon. The model of the homeland security ecosystem should 
therefore thrive to create characteristics commonly found in organizations that resemble 
open networked systems with the understanding and benefit of knowing that the 
characteristics of the ecosystem can influence and benefit the decision-making process of 
agency leaders when dealing with complex homeland security issues. 
In both case studies, the research has noted there are advantages of the ecosystem 
as well as the hierarchical model. For example, the ecosystem model requires leaders to 
move away from a traditional fragmented approach to problem solving, to one of 
collaboration. The model encourages dialogue and problem solving that takes into 
account the various perspectives of decision makers, which in turn creates networks. 
Although the model creates diversity, it is also understood that diversity can create 
challenges to communication and understanding, but interdependences can create the 
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incentive to overcome these challenges, which lead to greater learning and trust.185  This 
holds true for other attributes of both models, which will require leaders to have a full 
understanding of the environment work in and how best to adapt when confronted with 
complex issues. 
Information sharing also emerged as a critical attribute through the analysis in 
both case studies. The concept of creating information sharing platforms and networks 
that allow connectivity within the homeland security environment has been and will 
continue to be paramount to the future success in homeland security’s all hazards, all 
crimes, and all threats approach to public safety. The impact strategic plans can have on 
decision makers is also identified in both models. 
The strategic plan developed by Governor Jon Corzine, Strategy for Safe Streets 
and Neighborhoods,186 followed a traditional hierarchical model of planning while 
incorporating the concepts attributed to open system thinking or “ecosystems thinking” as 
referred to by this author. It was evident that the plan did not develop out of emerging 
ideas from the communities it was meant to assist with support from the highest levels of 
government. Rather, it was written and delivered with a hierarchical top down approach. 
The result; its effectiveness was limited as it did not have feedback loops and learning 
that would have encouraged communities to adapt, learn, and develop new strategies on a 
reoccurring basis. 
Finally, the research set out to answer the question, “What can be learned by 
examining the New Jersey Homeland security environment through both hierarchical and 
ecosystem models and what influence can those heuristic templates do to aid 
organizational decision making?”  The case study analysis identified characteristics of 
both models, paramount to the contribution in solving complex issues. A third model was 
identified and presented in the application section of this research, which clearly 
described how the combination of both the ecosystem and hierarchical models influenced 
decision makers. The NJ ROIC, during the operational period associated with the events 
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of Hurricane Sandy demonstrated how both ecosystem and hierarchical characteristics 
can influence decision makers and allow for an emergence of ideas to solve complex 
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